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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines some of the social and psychological factors affecting individual 
cooperative and risk-taking behavior. Specifically, laboratory experiments were conducted in 
order to shed more light on the interactive forces affecting individual contributions to public goods 
and individual giving in dictator game settings. Moreover, biometrics data were utilized to provide 
a stronger understanding of the true effect of positive and negative moods on risk preferences. 
 First, the interaction between high- and low-income individuals in voluntary contributions 
mechanisms is examined by varying group composition and marginal-per-capita-return. A finite 
mixture model is used to split each income type into two categories. While free-riders were present 
among both income types, the majority of low-income individuals were classified as opportunists, 
who strategically increased their contributions in the presence of high-income individuals in order 
to benefit from their resources. On the other hand, high-income individuals were predominantly 
selfists, who deliberately decreased their contributions in the presence of the low-income type due 
mainly to self-interest and caution. 
 Next, the perception of social norms as a first impulse or last resort is investigated in the 
context of individual giving in dictator games. Three variants of the dictator game are used, which 
differed in the way the dictator roles were assigned. By creating an environment where role 
assignment was random but open for interpretation, it was found that social norms compliance is 
not impulsively sought by individuals. Rather, adherence to social norms is only observed when 
the environment does not allow for an interpretation that can be used to break the prevalent norm. 
 Finally, facial expression analysis is used to provide a more accurate assessment of the effect 
of positive and negative mood on risk preferences. A dilution effect issue was uncovered, which is 
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inherent in the conventional experimental design used for tackling this question. The results served 
to address a controversy over the direction of the effect of mood on risk preference, showing that 
both positive and negative mood acted to decrease risk-aversion. Finally, the importance of the 
risk preference elicitation method used in this type of research was demonstrated.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The individual decision-making process is a complex engine that combines – and is influenced by 
– several psychological and environmental inputs. With the advent of behavioral economics, we 
now understand how limited our definition of “rational decision-maker” was, and how much it 
suffered when translated to real-world behavior. We now realize the need to adopt a more flexible 
definition of “rational decision-maker” and to construct refined models that can accommodate a 
wider spectrum of behavioral responses to different economic settings. 
Understanding how individuals make choices, and what factors affect their preferences for 
different actions and alternatives, is crucial in every society. This knowledge forms the basis 
through which valuable policy recommendations can be extended to help guide interventions 
designed to improve people’s lives and increase the general level of welfare in the community. 
Behavioral economics offers a venue through which we can help individuals make better decisions, 
help producers increase their efficiency and profitability, and help policy-makers implement more 
effective intervention programs.  
The surge in experimental and behavioral research in the past decades has uncovered an 
undeniable common ground between individual psychology and decision making. It has also 
demonstrated the need for a broader perspective when studying individual behavior. To this end, 
this dissertation is intended to take one step further in this direction by investigating the social and 
psychological determinants of cooperative and risk-taking behavior. Moreover, it incorporates 
recent developments in the field of experimental and behavioral economics by utilizing biometric 
data to address a longstanding controversy related to the effect of mood on risk preferences. The 
objectives herein are summarized below: 
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1. Investigate the interaction between high- and low-income individuals in voluntary 
contributions mechanisms and examine behavioral changes driven by differences in the 
perceived benefit from the public good.  
2. Refine the behavioral model related to the role of social norms in individual giving 
behavior, hence, providing a deeper understanding of the way individuals interact with and 
are affected by social norms when deciding how much to give to others. 
3. Utilize biometrics data, mainly facial expression analysis technology to assess emotions, 
to provide a more accurate assessment of the underlying effect of positive and negative 
moods on risk preferences and uncover a major issue with the conventional experimental 
designs used for studying the role of mood on individual behavior. 
Laboratory experiments were used to address the above three points in chapters I, II, and III 
respectively. This is followed by a conclusion section, which highlights the main findings and 
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 CHAPTER II 
SELF SERVING MOTIVATIONS OF HIGH- AND LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS IN 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS MECHANISMS 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Public goods are an integral part of any society. They are very important to us as consumers since 
we use them on an almost daily basis. They are also important to policy-makers, who are regularly 
confronted with questions regarding which public good to provide and how to finance it. Finally, 
they are especially important to producers, and one of the most important examples that motivates 
this chapter are generic advertising programs, where a complete industry join together to 
collectively finance generic advertisements that are aimed at increasing the overall demand for 
their commodity. Of course, it is clear that generic advertising is in nature a public good, since all 
the producers of a certain commodity would contribute to those advertisements and would later 
reap the benefits of the resulting increase in the demand for their product. In fact, it is estimated 
that every $1 invested in generic advertisements leads to an average of $3-$6 in additional revenue 
(Messer, 2008). 
 Tremendous amounts of money are spent by the government every year on public goods 
in general and generic advertising in particular. According to the congressional budget office, the 
U.S. government spends around $500 billion annually on public goods. More than $1 billion of 
this budget is allocated to generic advertising alone. For instance, $47 million is spent every year 
on generic advertising for cheese, $45 million on beef, $24 million on Florida orange juice, $15 
million on cotton, and $14 million on pork (Brester and Schroeder, 1995; Williams et al., 2004; 
Kaiser et al., 1994; Forker, 1988). 
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 Regarding the question of how to finance public goods, the two predominant methods are 
mandatory contribution mechanisms (MCMs) and voluntary contribution mechanisms (VCMs). 
Clearly, as the names imply, MCMs depend on a specific policy that forces everyone to contribute 
to public goods, while VCMs rely on individuals voluntarily paying money into an account to help 
finance the public good. Despite several arguments in favor of the effectiveness of MCMs, the 
carry many disadvantages. For example, they are considered rigid, costly, and in the particular 
case of generic advertising were ruled as unconstitutional by the federal appeals court (Messer, 
2008; Ward, 2010). The failure of generic advertising under MCMs was driven by a public outcry 
from both larger and smaller producers to appeal to the supreme court against this mechanism 
(Messer et al., 2004). While larger producers claimed the costs of forced investments to be triple 
the cost they incur in advertising their own brands, small producers argued against paying 
relatively high advertising costs considering their size in the industry (Messer et al. 2004, Crespi, 
2003; Crespi and McEowen, 2006). On the other hand, VCMs are potentially convenient and 
despite prominent free-riding tendencies in those mechanisms, there is ample laboratory and real-
world evidence of significant contributions in VCM. This fact has shifted interest towards 
determining the main motivations that drive voluntary contributions to public goods (Andreoni, 
1995; Sugden, 1984; Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; 
Anderson et al., 1998; Keser and van Winden, 2000). To this end, this paper investigates the 
behavior in VCMs of individuals with heterogeneous incomes grouped separately and in mixed 
groups with homogeneous and heterogeneous relative returns from the public good. This 
investigation explains the interaction between higher- and lower-income individuals (or large and 
small producers in the case of generic advertising) and changes in their behavior resulting from 
different expectations regarding their relative gain from the provision of the public good.  
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 The predominant models in the literature explain giving in public goods games to be a 
result of social preferences, namely altruism, warm glow, inequality aversion, and reciprocity 
(Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni, 1989; Becker, 1974; Sugden, 1984). The first model, 
altruism, argues that individuals derive utility from the consumption of others (Becker, 1974; 
Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni, 1990; Levine, 1998). Warm glow is somewhat related to altruism, 
except that it is more concerned with the utility realized from the very act of giving (Kahneman 
and Knetsch, 1992; Andreoni, 1990; Andreoni, 1995). On the other hand, inequality aversion 
assumes a fair individual who dislikes inequalities in income and/or consumption (Bolton and 
Ockenfelds, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ashley et al., 2010), while reciprocity perceives 
fairness as the reciprocal action of mirroring the behavior of others (Sugden, 1984; Fischbacher, 
2001; Croson, 2007).  
 The vast experimental research on VCMs has identified several other factors that affect 
levels of contribution to public goods. For instance, Isaac et al. (1994) reported that group size is 
directly proportional to contribution levels. It was also found that contributions might be a result 
of confusion (Andreoni, 1995), are enhanced by the presence of institutions (Kosfeld et al., 2009) 
and altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gatcher, 2002), and are influenced by the particular framing 
of the task (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000).  
 Few papers have already considered the effect of income heterogeneity on contributions in 
VCMs. In fact, the effect of income heterogeneity has been examined using linear (Kachelmeier 
and Shehata ,1997; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Buckley and Croson, 2006) and nonlinear (Bergstrom 
et al., 1986; Chan et al., 1996; Chan et al., 1999) public goods settings.1 In a linear public goods 
                                               
1 We only discuss literature pertaining to linear public goods here since it is pertinent to the paper. A review of some 
of the literature on nonlinear public goods is provided in Buckley and Croson (2006) 
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setting, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1997) and Isaac and Walker (1988) studied the effects of 
monitoring and communication, respectively, on contributions using heterogeneous incomes. 
However, these papers do not separately report the contributions across different income levels. 
Buckley and Croson (2006) addressed this issue by conducting an experiment where they used two 
endowment levels (25 and 50 tokens). By constructing mixed groups, consisting of two members 
from each endowment level, they show that less wealthy individuals contribute the same as the 
wealthier in absolute terms, which of course translates to a higher percentage contribution by the 
less wealthy. 
Heterogeneous relative returns, or marginal per capita returns (MPCR), have been 
theoretically investigated by Kinateder and Merlino (2017), who considered heterogeneity in cost 
and valuation in settings with endogenous networks. Experimental applications of this 
heterogeneity have been conducted by Isaac and Walker (1988), Fisher et al. (1995), and Cardenas 
et al. (2002). They all report a negative correlation between MPCR and contribution levels. 
However, while Isaac and Walker (1988) and Fisher et al. (1995) varied MPCR by changing the 
return from the public good, variations in MPCR were introduced in Cardenas et al. (2002) by 
changing the valuations of the private good.  
 In this paper, we combine heterogeneity in income and MPCR in order to gain a better 
understanding of the interactive effects of those two factors. Unlike Buckley and Croson (2006), 
high- and low-income individuals were placed in separated and mixed income groups. 
Heterogeneity in MPCR was introduced in the mixed income groups, which consisted of two low- 
and two high-income individuals. Specifically, three types of mixed income groups were 
constructed: 1) homogeneous MPCR; 2) increasing MPCR with income, where high-income 
individuals benefited more from the public good; and 3) decreasing MPCR with income, where 
  7 
low-income individuals benefited more from the public good. The comparison of separated income 
groups with mixed income, homogeneous MPCR groups will help us determine any changes in 
behavior resulting from the mere presence of high- or low-income members in the group. 
Moreover, the cross comparison of mixed income groups with each other and with separated 
income groups will shed light on how differences in the relative return of high- and low-income 
individuals from the public good affect their contributions. Analyzing those effects could 
potentially reveal some of the determining forces that shape contributions in those settings and 
some of the characteristics of the underlying individuals.   
 We find a significant increase in the average contributions of low-income individuals when 
high-income individuals are present, even when the public good bears the same benefit to all 
members (i.e., the mere presence of high-income individuals causes low-income individuals to 
contribute more to the public good). On the other hand, there is a significant decline in average 
contributions of high-income individuals when low-income individuals are present, even when the 
public good bears the same benefit to all members (i.e., the mere presence of low-income 
individuals causes high-income individuals to contribute less to the public good). Moreover, while 
there is evidence of free-riding behavior under both income levels, the percentage of high-income 
free-riders is significantly lower than the percentage of low-income free-riders. Our framework 
was analyzed using a finite mixture model with different types of low- and high-income 
individuals. Low-income individuals were classified as either “free-riders” or “opportunists” (who 
strategically increase their contributions in the presence of high-income individuals in order to 
encourage higher contributions and gain access to the resources of high-income members). As for 
high-income individuals, they were classified as either “free-riders” or “selfists” (who, due to self-
centered interests, deliberately decrease their contributions in situations where low-income 
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individuals are present and/or are in advantageous positions). Finally, a tremble parameter was 
used to account for the possibility of mistakes and/or loss of concentration, thus allowing for a less 
rigid definition of free-riders.  
 The significance of this paper stems from its high applicability in the real-world and its 
role in providing policy makers a deeper understanding of the interaction between high- and low-
income individuals and the dominant motivations determining their behavior towards public good 
provision. When considering generic advertising for example, it is unreasonable to view producers 
as identical in income and/or the perceived benefit from the public good. In fact, this is one of the 
main issues raised by different types of producers when fighting mandatory contribution programs 
to generic advertisements. Small producers claim to be disadvantaged by this rigid mechanism, 
arguing that being forced to pay a specific amount of money leaves them at a disadvantage relative 
to larger producers (Zheng et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2009). On the other hand, while larger 
producers have advocated expansions in generic advertising programs, they too argue against 
mandatory programs (Forker, 1988). Hence, by constructing simplified environments to study the 
interaction of high- and low-income individuals in this setting, we can provide a better 
understanding of the behavior of larger and smaller producers under a voluntary mechanism, which 
will in turn enable us to investigate ways that can enhance this interaction and generate higher 
returns to all members. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the experimental design and procedures are 
described in section 2, followed by a simplified theoretical model in section 3, which explains 
potential behavior of both income types. Section 4 includes the data analysis and a discussion of 
the main results, while section 5 presents the structural regression model, which was constructed 
  9 
based on observed regularities in the behavior of high- and low-income individuals. The last 
section briefly summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper.  
2.2 Experimental Design 
 
A total of 140 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the experiment, which 
consisted of a baseline and three treatment groups. Subjects were paid $5 for their participation 
plus the amount of any earnings they made during the experiment. Upon arrival to their session, 
subjects read and signed a consent form, after which they completed the public goods game (which 
differed based on the treatment), filled a short questionnaire regarding demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, received their payments, and were escorted out of the session.2 
Subjects were randomly split into high- and low-income types, where each subject 
participated in twelve rounds of the public goods game (2 practice and 10 real rounds). High-
income type individuals were endowed with 750 tokens in each round, while low-income type 
individuals were endowed with 250 tokens in each round. Participants were divided into groups of 
four members, where each group played the public goods game separately. In each round, subjects 
were required to decide how to divide their endowments between two accounts: private and public 
accounts. Participants were explained that each token allocated to the private account yields 1 cent 
only to the person who invested it, while each token allocated to the public account yields a return 
less than one cent to all members of the group.  
The return from every token allocated to the public account differed by treatment, as did 
the group composition. Following each round, each subject was given information regarding their 
own contribution to the public account, the total contribution of their group to the public account, 
                                               
2 This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University and subjects were told that privacy 
will be maintained regarding their information and that any data collected will only be used for research purposes. 
The public goods game and subsequent questionnaire were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
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their earnings from the private and public accounts, and their total earnings for the round. One of 
the ten real rounds was randomly selected as binding at the end of the experiment and subjects 
were paid according to their earnings in this binding round. The two practice rounds, along with 
various examples on how the private and public accounts work, were included in order to avoid 
confusion and to make sure that everyone had a good understanding of the procedure. 
The instructions made it clear to the participants that the group members will remain 
anonymous to one another throughout the entire experiment and that at no point will the identity 
of any of the group members be revealed to the other members of the group. In order to avoid 
changes in behavior from reputation effects, a stranger design was implemented in which the 
participants were randomly reassigned to new groups each round. Moreover, subjects had an 
understanding that their investment decisions will be completely confidential, as will their earnings 
from each round.  
The high- and low-income types played independent of each other in the baseline group, 
hereafter “separated groups, homogeneous return” (SHR). That is, each four-member group was 
entirely made up of either high-income or low-income individuals. Subjects were aware that each 
member in their group received the same number of tokens in each round (250 for low-income or 
750 for high-income individuals). Also, within each group, every token that any member invests 
in the public account yielded half a cent to each member of the group (i.e., the MPCR was 0.5 for 
all members in the baseline treatment).  
In the other three treatments, the high- and low-income types were mixed together in the 
same group, where each group was made up of two high-income and two low-income individuals. 
The participants were aware that the group members had different endowments, but they were not 
given information on the individual endowments of each member in the group. However, they 
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knew their own endowment and the average endowment of the group (including them), which was 
500 tokens in all cases. Hence, they were able to classify themselves as belonging to the high- or 
low-income types.  
The first treatment, hereafter “mixed groups, homogenous return” (MHR), was identical 
to the baseline treatment in that the MPCR was equal to 0.5 for all members. The only difference 
was the group composition. In the second treatment, “mixed groups, increasing return” (MIR) the 
MPCR was directly proportional to the initial endowment, meaning that high-income individuals 
benefited more than low-income individuals from every token invested in the public account. The 
participants were clearly explained that their return from every token that any of their group 
members invests in the public account is positively related to their endowments. The instructions 
also specified the individual MPCR, which was equal to 0.75 for high-income individuals and 0.25 
for low-income individuals. Finally, in the third treatment, “mixed groups, decreasing return” 
(MDR), the MCPR was inversely proportional to the initial endowment, meaning that low-income 
individuals benefited more than high-income individuals from every token invested in the public 
account. Again, this was clearly explained to the subjects and they were given their individual 
MPCR, which was 0.25 for high-income individuals and 0.75 for low income individuals. Table 1 
summarizes the main parameters in each treatment. 
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2.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
This section presents the main theoretical framework that explains potential changes in the 
behavior of high- and low-income individuals when heterogeneities in income and relative returns 
are introduced. The model presented here will be based on the well-established evidence of 
positive contributions to public goods and on the fact that individual contributions are positively 
correlated with group average contributions (Bardsley 2000; Fischbacher and Gatcher 2010). By 
incorporating those elements, we can write the payoff individual ! realizes from the VCM in the 
following form: 
 
                                              "# = (&# − (#) + +(# + +∑ (-((̅)/-01                                             (1) 
 
where &# is the initial endowment for individual !, (# is his/her contribution to the public account, + is the MPCR, the first term on the right-hand side represents the payoff from the amount he/she 
places in the private good, the second term is his/her payoff from own contribution to the public 
good, and the third term is his/her payoff from the contributions of other members to the public 
good. The dependency of individual contributions on group average contributions is captured by 
writing (- as a function of (̅, thus assuming that individual ! is aware of, or alternatively believes 
in, this proportional relationship when deciding how much to invest in the public account. The 
positive correlation is captured by the assumption 
234235 > 0. 
 Following this framework, we can represent the payoff of a low-income individual playing 
in a separated income group by: 
 
                                               "#8 = (&#8 − (#8) + +(#8 + +∑ (-8((̅)/-01 .                                         (2) 
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On the other hand, his/her payoff when playing in a mixed income group is given by: 
 
                                  9#8 = (&#8 − (#8) + +(#8 + +:(-8((̅) + +; ∑ (<=((̅)><01                             (3) 
 
where : and ; are reaction factor parameters, which capture how the low- and high-income 
individuals react to the general presence of members from the opposite income type. The idea 
behind those parameters is that, ceteris paribus, individuals might choose to change their general 
behavior in a public goods game merely because they find themselves playing with individuals 
from a different income class. For instance, the presence of high-income individuals might increase 
or decrease the low-income type’s general aptitude for giving compared to what they would have 
done when playing in a separated income group. Over the course of the game, it is reasonable to 
assume that those parameters will depend positively on own MPCR and group average 
contributions. Hence, we can write the parameters as :(+, (̅) and ;(+, (̅), with positive partial 
derivatives. If high- and low-income individuals are not responsive to the presence of the opposite 
income type, then ; and : will take a value of one. On the other hand, if they react positively 
(negatively) with a general increase (decrease) in contributions, then ; and : will be greater (less) 
than one. 
 Given this structure, we can consider the three possible behavioral changes a low-income 
individual can decide on as a result of playing with individuals from the opposite income type. 
Relative to what they would have done in a separated income group, low-income individuals can 
either increase or decrease their contributions or keep them unchanged. We start with the change 
in payoff resulting from an increase in contributions, which we calculate by assuming the 
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individual contributes (@#8  in the separated income group and (A#8  in the mixed income group (with (A#8 > (@#8 ) and subtracting equation (2) from (3) to get: 
 		∆"#8 = D(@#8 − (A#8 E + +D(A#8 − (@#8 E + +F:(-8((̅A) − (-8((̅@)G + +F; ∑ (<=((̅A) −><01 ∑ (H8((̅@)>H01 G    (4) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side is the loss in payoff resulting from the decreased investment 
in the private account, while the second term is the return resulting from the increased investment 
in the public account. This is straightforward since increasing one’s contributions to the public 
good necessitates withdrawing that amount from the private account. The third term captures the 
gain or loss from the change in the behavior of the other low-income individual between separated 
and mixed income groups. Finally, the fourth term represents the gain or loss resulting from the 
difference in the contributions of the two remaining high-income individuals in the mixed income 
group and the two remaining low-income individuals in the separated income group. 
 Similarly, we can write the change in the payoff of low-income individuals if they decrease 
their contribution from (@#8  to (I#8  in the mixed income group as: 
 ∆"#8 = D(@#8 − (I#8 E + +D(I#8 − (@#8 E + +F:(-8((̅I) − (-8((̅@)G + +F; ∑ (<=((̅I) −><01 ∑ (H8((̅@)>H01 G     (5) 
 
while the change in their payoff resulting from a no change in contribution can be written as 
 
                              ∆"#8 = +F:(-8((̅@) − (-8((̅@)G + +F; ∑ (<=((̅@) −><01 ∑ (H8((̅@)>H01 G.                        (6) 
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 A payoff maximizing agent will select the strategy that provides him/her with the most 
favorable change in outcome. While the sum of the first two terms is clearly negative in equation 
(4) and positive in equation (5), the outcome of the third and fourth terms depends on how the 
individual perceives : and ;. However, it is straightforward to see that those terms are positively 
correlated with own contribution. Hence, they are higher in equation (4) than (5). This creates the 
tradeoff that defines the change in behavior. If individuals believe the benefits gained by increasing 
the contribution from (@#8  to (A#8  (the last two terms in equation 4) outweigh the losses realized 
from the lower payoff generated by their own investments (the first two terms in equation 4) then 
they are better off increasing contributions in the mixed relative to the separated income group. If 
the opposite is true, then they are better off decreasing contributions. Finally, if they think the 
changes offset each other, then they are better off not changing their behavior.  Similar logic can 
be applied to high-income individuals.3  
 
Hypothesis 1: The individual’s perception of : and ; dictates their preferred change in behavior 
when playing with members from the opposite income type. They will select the strategy that 
maximizes their payoff. 
 
 Based on this model, we can now investigate the effects of changing the + to understand 
potential changes in behavior in the treatments with heterogeneous MPCR. Looking at equation 
(4), we can see that as + increases, the first two terms become less negative (more positive in 
equation 5) while the third and fourth terms are scaled up. Moreover, considering the experimental 
                                               
3 An elaborate discussion of the potential changes in the behavior of a high-income individual is presented in the 
appendix. 
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design, we can note that :(+, (̅) and ;(+, (̅) move in opposite direction. This is because they are 
both positively correlated with +, which either increases for low- and decreases for high-income 
individuals or vice versa. Hence, the change in the individual’s behavior when heterogeneity in 
MPCR is introduced depends on their perception of the potential changes in outcome resulting 
from alterations in :(+, (̅) and ;(+, (̅). This leads us to our second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in MPCR can stimulate further changes in contribution through their 
impact on : and ;. 
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
A breakdown of average total contributions and average percent contributions by treatment and 
income type is presented in Figure 1 and Table 2. The average total contributions, and average 
percent contributions, of low-income individuals are significantly higher in the MHR and MDR 
compared to the SHR and MIR treatments. In fact, besides the comparison between MHR and 
MIR, which was marginally significant (t-test, P=0.09), all cross comparisons of MHR and MDR 
with SHR and MIR were significant at the 95% confidence level (t-test, P<0.05). This is taken as 
evidence that lower-income individuals contribute more towards the public good when high-
income individuals are present and the public good bears equal or more benefit to them. More 
importantly, the result indicates that the mere presence of high-income individuals causes low-
income individuals to increase their contributions to the public good even when MPCR is left 
unchanged. This kind of behavior might stem from a self-centered interest to maximize one’s 
return. Perhaps this increase in contribution levels in the presence of high-income individuals 
represents a deliberate attempt by low-income individuals to signal low free-riding tendencies to 
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the high-income type, thus encouraging them to put forward generous contributions to the public 
good. By pooling in the resources of the high-income type, low-income individuals can increase 
their overall return by reaping the benefits generated from the public good. 
 





Figure 1. Breakdown of average contributions by treatment and endowment type 
 
Table 3, which presents the payoffs for each treatment and endowment type that would 
result from the two extreme strategies FC and FR, adds perspective to this conclusion and helps 
High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income
Contribution 279.7 104.9 Contribution 224.5 124.6
Percent Contribution 0.37 0.42 Percent Contribution 0.30 0.50
High-Income Low-Income High-Income Low-Income
Contribution 424.5 107.8 Contribution 132.4 131.2
Percent Contribution 0.57 0.43 Percent Contribution 0.18 0.52
Separated Groups, Homogeneous Return (SHR) Mixed Groups, Homogeneous Return (MHR)
Mixed Groups, Increasing Return (MIR) Mixed Groups, Decreasing Return (MDR)
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explain the lack of change in contributions between the SHR and MIR treatments. Here, FC refers 
to the fully cooperative strategy where all members contribute their full endowments to the public 
good and FR refers to the Nash equilibrium strategy where all members free-ride and contribute 
nothing to the public good. As we can see, the cooperative outcome carries the same return to low-
income individuals in the SHR and MIR treatments. It is important to highlight that following our 
previous reasoning, low-income individuals are only keen on encouraging higher contributions 
from high-income individuals when the presence of those individuals provides an added benefit 
that could potentially be realized from the public good. In other words, low-income individuals 
should only contribute more in the MHR and MDR treatments since the presence of high-income 
individuals in those two treatments inflates their potential return from the public good to $10 and 
$15 respectively. This is exactly what we observe in the data.   
 
Table 3. Expected Payoff Summary by Treatment and Endowment Type 
 
Notes: FC refers to the strategy where every member in the group contributes all of his/her endowment to the public 




For high-income individuals, it is clear that average total contributions, and average percent 
contributions, are significantly lower in the MHR and MDR compared to the SHR and MIR 
treatments. In fact, the effects are somewhat more pronounced than those of the low-income type. 
FC FR FC FR
Low-Income $5 $2.5 Low-Income $10 $2.5
High-Income $15 $7.5 High-Income $10 $7.5
FC FR FC FR
Low-Income $5 $2.5 Low-Income $15 $2.5
High-Income $15 $7.5 High-Income $5 $7.5
Separated Groups, Homogeneous Return (SHR) Mixed Groups, Homogeneous Return (MHR)
Mixed Groups, Increasing Return (MIR) Mixed Groups, Decreasing Return (MDR)
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Besides the comparison between SHR and MHR, which was significant at the 95% confidence 
level (t-test, P=0.024), all cross comparisons of MHR and MDR with SHR and MIR were 
significant at the 99% confidence level (t-test, P=0.000). This result indicates that high-income 
individuals contribute less towards the public good when low-income individuals are present and 
the public good bears equal or less benefit to them. More importantly, it implies that the mere 
presence of low-income individuals causes high-income individuals to decrease their contributions 
to the public good even when MCRP is left unchanged. This can be explained by a combination 
of self-centered interest and a precautionary tendency that becomes more prominent in the 
presence of the low-income type. Again, the payoff matrix for high-income individuals in Table 3 
provides more insight to this hypothesis. Under altruism and inequality aversion, it would be 
expected that high-income individuals would not change or even increase their contributions in the 
MHR and MDR treatments, since that would benefit low-income individuals and help decrease 
the earnings gap between the two types. However, the fact that contributions by high-income 
individuals significantly decreased in those treatments implies that even though altruism and/or 
inequality aversion might still be operating, they are overshadowed by motivations of self-interest 
and mistrust.  
  From the perspective of high-income individuals, the probability of free-riding is higher 
when the low-income type is present. This is because it is more likely that someone with a low-
income would be inclined to free-ride and depend on high-income individuals to contribute to the 
public good. Therefore, driven by a self-centered interest not to be taken advantage of, high-
income individuals decrease their contributions to the public good. The fact that the contribution 
levels of the high-income type are lowest in the MDR treatment favors self-interest as the dominant 
force driving the behavior of high-income individuals. Here, the public good carries a bigger 
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reward to low-income individuals, which significantly decreases their free-riding motivations 
since they have more reason to invest in the public good. Generous contributions by high-income 
individuals in this treatment can only be explained by altruism and/or inequality aversion, since 
the high-income type is better off with the FR scenario in this case. However, the sharp decrease 
in average contributions by the high-income type to a mere 18% supports the hypothesis regarding 
the significance of self-interest and its role as one of the main motivations driving the behavior of 
the high-income type.  
The results are further analyzed for low- and high-income individuals in panels a and b of 
Figure 2, respectively. The left side of the panels separates percent contribution into 10 categories 
ranging from 0-100% and shows the fraction of the overall low- and high-income samples in each 
category. This result is broken down by treatment on the right side of the panels. The clustering of 
observations in the 0-0.1 interval for both income types under all treatments is indicative of the 
presence of free-riding behavior, at least among some individuals. However, it is also important 
to note the clustering at the 0.9-1 interval in most cases. For low-income individuals, we observe 
a slight rightward shift in the histogram of contributions under the MHR and MDR treatments 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, P<0.027). On the other hand, we also observe a leftward shift in the 
histogram of contributions for high-income individuals under those treatments (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, P<0.013). This further supports the notion concerning the motivations that determine 
the behavior of low- and high-income individuals in those scenarios. 
 
  21 
 
Figure 2. Histograms of percent contribution by treatment and endowment type 
 
The effects of the different treatments on percent contribution were estimated in Table 4 
using several Tobit regression specifications in order to ensure robustness of the above results. The 
specification in column 1 investigates the treatment effects leaving out any other potential 
explanatory variables. Learning effects are examined in column 2 by including the variable period, 
which represents the round number, while the demographic effects of gender and school year are 
controlled for in column 3.  
Firstly, our results are consistent with the universal finding in the literature concerning the 
presence of a learning effect. We observe a significant, albeit small, downward trend across periods 
































































































































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Percent Contribution
Overall Rich Population
  22 
at the treatment effects for high- and low-income individuals, it is clear that the results in Table 4 
strongly support our conclusions. Low-income individuals contribute significantly more in the 
MHR and MDR treatments, while high-income individuals contribute significantly less in those 
treatments under all specifications. This bolsters our confidence regarding the hypothesized 
opportunistic and self-centered motivations of low- and high-income individuals respectively. 
Finally, concerning demographic effects, the results indicate a slightly higher contribution rate 
among males compared to females and among upper- compared to lower-school year students.  
 
Table 4. Tobit Model Capturing Average Treatment Effects for High- and Low-Income Types 
 
Notes: The data contained a total of 258 left-censored and 175 right-censored observations. Considering the 
significance of sigma under all specifications, a Tobit regression generates significantly different estimates compared 
to an OLS regression. 
Variable
Constant 0.398 0.506 0.262
(0.037) (0.044) (0.047)
Rich -0.073 -0.073 -0.066
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
MHR 0.121 0.120 0.081
(0.050) (0.050) (0.041)
MIR -0.008 -0.007 -0.045
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
MDR 0.160 0.160 0.137
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
MHR*Rich -0.197 -0.197 -0.195
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
MIR*Rich 0.291 0.290 0.312
(0.073) (0.072) (0.073)








Sigma 0.460 0.456 0.456
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 1,400 1,400 1,400
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2.5 Finite Mixture Model 
 
The robust findings presented in the previous section allow for the modeling of various types of 
high- and low-income individuals. Specifically, the high- and low-income types were each 
classified into two categories based on the observed behavior across treatments.4 Given the 
observed clustering of observations on the lower and upper limits, it is appropriate to consider a 
two-limit censored model, where we define the latent variable J∗ as desired contribution. Low-
income individuals were modeled as either “free-riders” or “opportunists”. Although free-riders 
are typically individuals who always contribute zero to the public good, the term was used more 
loosely here to allow for the possibility of mistakes and/or loss of concentration. Thus, instead of 
restricting this category to individuals who strictly contribute zero on every occasion, a tremble 
parameter was used to include individuals who contribute very low amounts on most occasions 
among free-riders. As for opportunists, they are defined as individuals who contribute more in the 
presence of the high-income type, but only when this presence carries potential benefits to them. 
Hence, while the desired contribution of free-riders is consistently near zero and is not related to 
other variables, the desired contribution of opportunists was assumed to depend linearly on a set 
of explanatory variables as follows: 
 
                J∗@LL = MN + M1 ∗ OPQ + M> ∗ RST!UV + M/ ∗ W+XS + MY ∗ Z[ℎUUXJT + ]              (7) 
 
Where J∗@LL is the desired contribution of opportunists, OPQ stands for rich-with-benefit and is 
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the high-income type are present and the situation is 
                                               
4 The model used in this analysis is similar to the one in Bardsley and Moffatt (2007). 
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beneficial for low-income individuals (i.e., it takes the value one in the MHR and MDR 
treatments), and ]~_(0, `>). The other explanatory variables are as described in the previous 
section and are included for the same reasons they were included in the Tobit regression 
specifications.  
The high-income type was also modeled as belonging to one of two categories, “free-
riders” and “selfists”. Here, selfists are defined as individuals who contribute less in the presence 
of low-income individuals, when this presence brings a potential disadvantage to them. Again, the 
less rigid definition of free-riders was adopted here and their desired contribution was assumed 
not to depend on other variables. On the other hand, the desired contribution of selfists was 
specified linearly as follows: 
 
                J∗aHb = MN + M1 ∗ cPd + M> ∗ RST!UV + M/ ∗ W+XS + MY ∗ Z[ℎUUXJT + ]               (8) 
 
Where J∗aHb  is the desired contribution of selfists, cPd stands for poor-with-disadvantage and is 
a dummy variable that takes the value one if the low-income type are present and the situation is 
disadvantageous for high-income individuals (i.e., it takes the value one in the MHR and MDR 
treatments), and ]~_(0, `>).   
While the latent variable J∗ can take any value on the real numbers line, the observed actual 
contribution J is restricted to values within the allowable range [0, endowment]. The relationship 
between actual contribution J and desired contribution J∗ is as follows: 
 
For opportunists and selfists: 
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                                                                          y = 0                                                                 (9b) 
 
where y5 is 750 tokens for high-income individuals and 250 tokens for low-income individuals. 
 In order to incorporate the less rigid definition of a free-rider, a tremble parameter ω was 
introduced to account for possible loss of concentration. On any round, there is a probability ω 
that the individual will lose concentration and choose his/her contribution randomly. The tremble 
parameter has been previously used in the literature (Bardsley and Moffatt 2007, Loomes et al. 
2002) and is specified similarly here, where it is allowed to decay throughout the experiment as 
follows: 
 
                                                   ω = ωN ∗ exp	[ω1 ∗ (period − 1)]                                         (10) 
 
With this specification, ωN represents the tremble at the beginning of the experiment, before any 
experience was accumulated, while ω1 represents the rate of decay in the tremble parameter as 
experience accumulates throughout the experiment. Hence, we expect ωN to be positive and ω1 to 
be negative. 
Given the above assumptions, we can write the conditional probabilities of y on each 
behavioral category as follows: 
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Low-income individuals 
For y = 250: P(y = 250|op) = (1 − ω) ∗ }1 − Φ>ÄNÅÇÉÅÇÑ∗=ÖÜÅÇá∗Làâ#@äÅÇã∗åçHàÅÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ìî + ï>Ä1		]											(11)	
 
                                                            P(y = 250|fr) = ï>Ä1                                                       (12) 
 
 
For 0 < y < 250: 
       f(y|op) = (1 − ω) ∗ 1í ∗ ΦóÅÇÉÅÇÑ∗=ÖÜÅÇá∗Làâ#@äÅÇã∗åçHàÅÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ì + ï>Ä1																	(13)																																																																													f(y|fr) = ô>Ä1                                                             (14) 
 
For y = 0: 
           P(y = 0|op) = (1 − ω) ∗ Φ ÇÉöÇÑ∗=ÖÜöÇá∗Làâ#@äöÇã∗åçHàöÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ì + ï>Ä1												(15)										 																																																							P(y = 0|fr) = 1 − >ÄNï>Ä1 																																																												(16)	
 
High-income individuals 
For y = 750: P(y = 750|slf) = (1 − ω) ∗ }1 − ΦüÄNÅÇÉÅÇÑ∗8Ö†ÅÇá∗Làâ#@äÅÇã∗åçHàÅÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ìî + ïüÄ1	(17)	
 
                                                            P(y = 750|fr) = ïüÄ1                                                       (18) 
  27 
 
For 0 < y < 750: 
        f(y|slf) = (1 − ω) ∗ 1í ∗ Φ óÅÇÉÅÇÑ∗8Ö†ÅÇá∗Làâ#@äÅÇã∗åçHàÅÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ì + ïüÄ1															(19)		 																																																																												f(y|fr) = ôüÄ1                                                           (20) 
 
For y = 0: 
           P(y = 0|slf) = (1 − ω) ∗ Φ ÇÉöÇÑ∗8Ö†öÇá∗Làâ#@äöÇã∗åçHàöÇé∗aèê@@Hëâí ì + ï>Ä1												(21)										 																																																									P(y = 0|fr) = 1 − üÄNïüÄ1 																																																										(22)		
Using this model allows not only the estimation of the parameters in the above equations, but also 
the estimation of the fraction of opportunists among low-income individuals and the fraction of 
selfists among high-income individuals.  
The estimated parameters for low- and high-income individuals are presented in Table 5. 
As expected, the coefficient on RWB was positive for opportunists and the coefficient on PWD 
was negative for selfists. This proves the dominance of the hypothesized motivations on the 
behavior of high- and low-income individuals. Based on these results, we are more confident about 
the conclusion that a substantial proportion of low-income individuals are behaving 
opportunistically by trying to entice the high-income type to submit generous contributions to the 
public good. Also, it is clear that the overruling majority of high-income individuals behave in a 
self-centered manner by keeping the bulk of their endowment rather than sharing it with the low-
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income type. It is worth noting that this result implies that low-income individuals were optimistic 
about the potential returns from increased contributions (they placed higher values on δ and γ), 
while high-income individuals were pessimistic about those prospects (they placed lower values 
on δ and γ). Moreover, it seems there are far more free-riders among low-income compared to 
high-income individuals. Whereas about a third of low-income individuals were estimated as free-
riders, only 3% of high-income individuals were classified into this category. This implies that the 
self-interest exhibited by high-income individuals in the MHR and MDR might be justified by the 
significant free-riding tendencies of the low-income type.  
The two tremble parameters were significant for both income types and carried the 
expected signs. While there is a significant probability that individuals will lose focus at the 
beginning of the experiment and contribute randomly, this probability consistently declines over 
the course of the experiment as subjects gain experience with the task. Also, it seems that low-
income individuals are not only more prone to losing focus at the start of the experiment, they also 
acquire experience slower than high-income individuals. It is highly probable that this difference 
is due to the task being somewhat more complicated for the low-income type. This is illustrated 
by considering that the dominant motivation of high-income individuals pushes them towards the 
Nash equilibrium of acting in a more self-interested way and contributing less, while the dominant 
motivation of low-income individuals pushes them away from the Nash equilibrium by acting 
opportunistically and contributing more to the public good. Thus, it is reasonable to think that a 
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Table 5. Finite Mixture, Two-Limit Tobit Model with Tremble 
 
   
 The coefficient on the variable period conforms to the universal finding that contributions 
decay across rounds. Although small, this coefficient was negative and significant for both income 
types, which suggests a consistent decline in contributions as individuals gain more experience 
with the task during the experiment. As for the coefficients on the demographic variables male and 
school year, they conform to the previous estimates in that they are positive and significant for 
both income types. Again, this suggests that there is a higher tendency to contribute for males than 
females and for upper- than lower-school year students. 
Variable Std. Error Std. Error
Constant 56.60 (38.96) 405.63 (50.79)
RWB/PWD 136.53 (35.11) -233.58 (39.78)
Period -7.94 (3.89) -16.73 (3.73)
Male 116.37 (26.26) 63.90 (33.64)
School Year 43.54 (12.78) 12.54 (11.20)
Sigma 84.61 (13.24) 299.15 (17.95)
w0 0.62 (0.04) 0.19 (0.11)
w1 -0.03 (0.01) -0.37 (0.19)





High-Income Individuals Low-Income Individuals
Parameter Parameter
840
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Voluntary contributions mechanisms (VCMs) present a convenient and potentially efficient 
provision method for public goods. The vast evidence of sizeable contributions under those 
mechanisms has directed interest towards determining the underlying motivations for this 
behavior. This paper investigates the interplay between income and relative marginal per capita 
return (MPCR) and their role in determining contribution levels in public goods settings.  
 A control and three treatments were constructed, where high- and low-income individuals 
were allowed to play separately and in mixed groups with homogenous and heterogeneous 
MPCRs. Subjects completed 12 rounds of a public goods game, consisting of 2 practice and 10 
real rounds, and were paid using a randomized lottery incentive design in order to encourage more 
concentration in each round.  
 On average, low-income subjects displayed more cooperative behavior in the presence of 
the high-income type, but only in situations where this presence carried potential advantages to 
them. On the other hand, high-income subjects displayed more self-centered behavior in the 
presence of the low-income type when this presence carried potential disadvantages to them. 
Moreover, there was evidence of free-riding behavior among both income types, which stimulated 
the structural modeling of different behavioral categories within each income type and the 
estimation of the main characteristics of those categories. 
 The overall behavior of low-income individuals can be well explained by the presence of 
free-riders, who in most cases contribute very small amounts to the public good, and opportunists, 
who strategically try to attract and benefit from higher contributions by the high-income type. As 
for high-income individuals, their behavior was explained by the presence of free-riders and 
selfists, who deliberately try to segregate from the low-income type mainly due to a self-centered 
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interest coupled with a sense of caution. However, it seems that the low-income type has a 
substantially higher propensity to free-ride than the high-income type, which might justify the 
inclination towards self-interest exhibited by high-income individuals.  
 In conclusion, this paper provides insights on the motivations driving the behavior of high- 
and low-income individuals in VCMs. The value of this paper derives from its relevance in real-
world applications and its usefulness in informing policy-makers about potential interactions 
between large and small producers in voluntary generic advertisement programs. Understanding 
the dynamic relationship between income and relative returns and how they affect behavior in 
public goods settings can help us devise more efficient programs that enable higher voluntary 
contributions to public goods, hence relieving the conflict over mandatory generic advertising 
programs. While more work might be necessary to provide a better understanding of the forces 
that govern behavior in situations with heterogeneous income levels and relative returns, this 
article serves as a first step in uncovering important ways of targeting the critical elements that can 
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CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL NORMS: FIRST IMPULSE OR LAST RESORT? 
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is well established that individual behavior in dictator games violates the predictions of 
economic theory. The bulk of the literature on this topic has shown that dictators are inclined to 
share around 30% of their endowment instead of adopting the payoff-maximizing strategy of 
keeping the entire amount. For instance, Engel (2011) conducted a meta-analysis where he plotted 
the distribution of average percent giving over 616 treatments from 129 studies and showed that it 
peaks around 28.4%. 
Driven by these consistent deviations from Nash equilibrium, a long line of research has 
emerged with the purpose to investigate the main motivations behind this seemingly selfless 
willingness to give. The early models explained giving in dictator games using “other regarding 
preference”, under which individuals are assumed to not only care about their own wellbeing, but 
also about the welfare of others. Under this paradigm, giving in dictator games is linked to either 
altruism, egocentrism, inequality aversion, or the Rawlsian maximin motive, which is a general 
tendency to help the least well-off (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr et al., 2006). However, these models fail to explain the 
anomalies of numerous experimental manipulations and findings reported in the literature (Dana 
et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Koch and Normann, 2008; Cappelen et al., 2013). As noted by 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) for instance, social preferences alone cannot account for the full 
extent of behavioral changes to treatments in dictator games, and if imposed to explain the 
distribution of dictator giving, would invoke strange assumptions about the utility function and/or 
distribution of individual preferences.  
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The major limitation of the philanthropic models is their inability to rationalize why 
variations in seemingly irrelevant parameters result in significant changes in behavior (Krupka and 
Weber, 2013). In fact, these models have been challenged with this very issue by several 
researchers who have introduced trivial changes in the context of the dictator game and obtained 
surprisingly different outcomes. For instance, Bolton et al. (1998) reported that restricting the 
dictator’s action space has a weakly significant positive impact on the amount given. Moreover, 
Bardsley et al. (2005) and List (2007) have shown that individuals are significantly more prone to 
give zero when their action set includes the option of taking money away from the receiver. 
If individuals were solely motivated by altruism, fairness, and inequality aversion, then 
simply allowing them to take money from the receiver, or restricting their action space to integer 
values, should not significantly affect the amount of money they decide to give. This is because 
the philanthropic person depicted by these models must make the transfer decision independent of 
the type of action space available. For example, if this person genuinely wanted to give a specific 
amount of money out of a desire to be fair or kind, then he should readily give the same amount 
regardless of whether or not an additional option of taking money away is presented. 
A recent model that circumvents this issue, and that has become widely accepted among 
economists, argues that giving in dictator games originates from an urge to comply with social 
norms (Hoffman et al., 1996; Bolton et al., 1998; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 
2013). The social norms model states that individuals give a positive amount in the dictator game 
because they feel a social obligation not to commit to the most selfish act of giving nothing, even 
if it was the payoff-maximizing strategy. To the extent that individuals abide by the prevailing 
social norms, these seemingly negligible changes in the experimental design could potentially lead 
to significant changes in behavior if they alter the underlying social structure of the setting. As 
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List (2007) argues, after introducing the “taking money” option, giving zero is no longer the most 
selfish act. This is especially the case in his symmetric treatment, where the dictator had the option 
of giving or taking up to $5 from the receiver. In this case, there is no social stigma associated with 
giving zero since it is now perceived as the neutral course of action. 
There is ample evidence in the literature that supports the social norms interpretation of 
behavior in dictator games and similar interactive settings. The model accommodates a wide 
spectrum of behavioral responses to treatments including reductions in giving when the 
endowment is earned rather than simply granted (Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; 
List and Cherry, 2008) and when the receiver is also given an endowment (Eckel et al., 2005). In 
both cases, the social obligation of giving a significant positive amount is dissipated as the 
dictator’s right to keep his endowment becomes more pronounced. 
Following the logic behind the social norms model, the presence – or lack thereof – of well 
perceived norms along with a socially evaluative setting acts as the main underlying motive that 
shapes the decisions of individuals in dictator games. This point is clearly illustrated through the 
work of Frey and Bohnet (1995), who showed that giving significantly increased in one variant of 
the dictator game where dictators stood up in order to be seen by everyone in the room prior to 
making their decisions. Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998) have also established this point 
by showing that dictators give more when the task is framed so that receivers are given the 
endowment and dictators are asked to decide how much to take away for themselves. Finally, 
Rigdon et al. (2009) demonstrated the role of social cues on dictator giving by presenting dictators 
with three dots in the shape of a watching eye. The authors report that the introduction of this form 
of minimal social cues led to a significant increase in dictator giving. 
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While the increased salience of social norms drives more giving in dictator games, the 
absence of such norms, as shown by Bardsley et al. (2005) and List (2007), carries the opposite 
effect. A particularly relevant study is Hoffman et al. (1994), who asserted that self-entitlement 
offers justifiable means for dictators to behave selfishly. The authors found that giving was 
substantially lower when subjects earned the right to become the dictator based on their scores in 
a general knowledge quiz. It seems that establishing property rights weakens the social norms 
associated with sharing half the endowment or offers flexibility of interpretation to disregard any 
norm advocating for equal split. After all, it is not socially inappropriate to give a smaller share of 
the endowment to the counterpart when possessing a rightful claim to that endowment. 
The important role played by social norms in determining behavior in dictator games, and 
reasonably other interactive settings, warrants a closer consideration of the nature with which this 
social convention operates and shapes our decisions. A question that poses itself in this regard is 
whether individuals feel a desire or an obligation to comply with social norms. When confronted 
with a certain social setting, is looking for what is socially appropriate regarded as the primal 
instinct, or is it something which individuals consider only after they run out of excuses to justify 
selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior? That is, are social norms considered a first impulse or a last 
resort? 
To address this question, we conducted a laboratory experiment where subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of three variants of the dictator game (control and two treatments). 
Receivers in all treatments were required to state their expectations regarding how much the 
dictators will transfer to them. However, the three versions differed in the way the dictator roles 
were assigned. Dictators were assigned randomly in the control group, while in treatment 1, 
hereafter “real entitlement”, they were assigned based on merit, following Hoffman et al. (1994). 
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Subjects in treatment 2, hereafter “fake entitlement”, were assigned in a way that was open for 
interpretation by the dictator. Although it was purely random, it was designed to give subjects 
some leeway to either treat it as such or claim it to be due to a personal skill. By comparing the 
behavior of dictators in the fake entitlement treatment to those in the control and real entitlement 
treatment, we can determine the way with which subjects regard social norms. Specifically, giving 
in the fake entitlement treatment should not be statistically different from the control if social 
norms are considered a first impulse, but should more closely resemble giving in the real 
entitlement treatment if they are considered a last resort. 
Our results conform with previous findings concerning the level of giving in the standard 
version of the dictator game. Moreover, as with Hoffman et al. (1994), we report a substantial 
decrease in giving when role assignment was done based on performance in a general knowledge 
quiz. The behavior of dictators in the fake entitlement treatment, where role assignment was 
random but masqueraded in a way that was open for interpretation, more closely resembled 
behavior in the merit-based assignment than the control. This indicates that subjects were keen on 
utilizing a self-serving bias to legitimize their claim to the endowment. Based on these results, 
compliance with social norms, at least as far as the behavior of dictators is concerned, seems like 
a burden that is imposed on those who cannot justify self-centered behavior. Interestingly, while 
dictators took advantage of the nature of role assignment in the fake entitlement treatment to escape 
the social obligation of making sizable positive transfers, receivers were more inclined to call upon 
those social norms when asked to state their beliefs regarding how much they will be receiving. In 
fact, receiver expectations of dictator giving in the fake entitlement treatment were very similar to 
the control and significantly higher than the real entitlement treatment. We conclude that the 
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perception of social norms as a first impulse or last resort is formed in a way that serves the 
individual’s self-interest given his current circumstances. 
This chapter extends the theoretical framework presented by Krupka and Weber (2013) to 
paint a more complete picture of the way individuals interact with social norms when deciding 
how much to give in dictator games and similar social settings. Our extended model can help 
explain the underlying effect of social framing on dictator giving, thus addressing the conflicting 
hypotheses that attribute social framing effects to a change in individuals’ preferences versus a 
change in their beliefs (Ellingsen et al., 2012; Dreber et al., 2013). As discussed later, we argue 
that it is through their role in the individual’s utility function that social norms, and social frames, 
affect dictator giving. Our notion is that individuals would mainly adopt a self-centered approach 
to a social setting so long that they can justify it (i.e., provided that they can behave this way 
without hurting their social image), but would succumb to social norms when the setting does not 
allow for an interpretation that can be used to maximize payoffs. The usefulness of this study lies 
in its ability to better explain the discrepancies between theory and laboratory behavior. Using our 
notion, a thorough assessment of the social structure of a particular setting can help us anticipate 
whether or not we will observe significant deviations from Nash equilibrium in that environment. 
Moreover, our results can prove useful as a basis from which valuable recommendations can be 
provided for charities and other fund-raising agencies on ways they can maximize the quantity and 
value of donations. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 presents the method used to elicit 
social norms across our three treatments. Section 3 includes a simple theoretical framework that 
explains the potential relationship between social norms and giving in dictator games. Section 4 
describes the experimental design and data, while section 5 presents the main results along with 
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robustness checks and a structural estimation of the parameters in the theoretical model. Section 6 
includes a discussion of the implications of the notion advanced in the study, while section 7 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
3.2 Experimental Design 
 
A total of 182 subjects (90 males and 92 females) were recruited to participate in the experiment 
in exchange for a $5 show-up fee. Participants were also informed that they might receive 
additional earnings depending on the outcome of the experiment. The subjects were undergraduate 
students at Texas A&M university with a mean age of 21 years.5 The study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board and the data was collected during the Summer 2016 and Fall 2016 
semesters. 
Upon arrival to their session, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two identical 
rooms (A and B), with equal number of participants in each room. Subjects were first given a 
consent form, which they had to read and sign, after which they were given thorough written 
instructions on the experimental procedure and the dictator game. The participants were instructed 
to remain quiet during the entire session and to raise their hand if they had any questions or needed 
any assistance with the protocol. The experimenters were available to answer any questions 
privately. 
Each subject in room A was randomly paired with a subject from room B, where one of 
them played as the dictator and the other as the receiver. Dictators were given a $10 endowment 
and were asked to decide how much of that endowment they would like to transfer to the receiver 
in their pair (located in the opposite room). They were free to choose any amount between $0 and 
                                               
5 The average age was somewhat high due to the presence of a few subjects aged 30 and above. 
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$10 in $0.5 increments. As for receivers, they were asked to state their beliefs by guessing how 
much the dictator would transfer to them out of his $10 endowment. They were also free to choose 
any amount between $0 and $10 in $0.5 increments. The instructions made it clear that the subjects 
in each pair were in different rooms and will remain anonymous to one another. Moreover, the 
dictators were assured that their decisions will remain confidential and will not be linked to them 
in any way. 
As mentioned before, participants were randomly assigned to the control and two 
treatments where the manner in which the dictator role was assigned differed across treatment. 
Dictator role assignment was made explicitly randomly in the control group, where participants 
were told that there were 50/50 odds that either subject in the pair will be selected as the dictator. 
In the real entitlement treatment, subjects were first asked to complete a general knowledge quiz, 
which consisted of 10 multiple choice questions. The questions spanned several topics including 
sports, science, history, geography, and political science. After completing the quiz, subjects were 
given their grade and the grade of the other member in their pair. It was explicitly stated that role 
assignment was based on performance in the quiz, where the subject with the higher grade would 
be chosen as the dictator. In this sense, the real entitlement treatment is designed to provide 
dictators with a rightful claim to the endowment, considering that they earned it through their 
performance in the general knowledge quiz. Similar to Hoffman et al. (1994), we expect the 
average amount given in this treatment to be significantly lower than the control. 
The fake entitlement treatment was designed in a way that, depending on the subjects’ 
interpretation, could be used to either mimic the control or the real entitlement treatment. Role 
assignment here was based on a die roll task. Each subject in the pair was asked to choose one of 
four different sizes of dice to play with (extra small, small, medium, and large). Moreover, they 
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were given the choice between throwing their die in an open or closed space. Participants who 
chose the open space rolled their dice on the large table in front of them, while those who chose 
the closed space were given a box to roll their dice in.6 The experimenters privately recorded the 
die roll for each participant in order to select the dictators. Participants were then given the results 
of their own die roll and the die roll of the other person in their pair. Again, it was explicitly stated 
that role assignment was based on the results from the die roll task, where the subject who rolled 
a higher number was chosen as the dictator. It is worth noting that Schurter and Wilson (2009) 
have also used a die roll to assign dictators and receivers. However, in their experiment, the way 
they used the die roll was equivalent to a coin flip, where one subject would be selected as the 
dictator if the die lands on an even number and vice versa. Moreover, they explicitly stated to the 
subjects that each had an equal chance of being selected as the dictator. 
Although assignment is clearly random in the fake entitlement treatment, the choice of die 
size and rolling space was included to disguise this fact and open it to interpretation. Moreover, 
when given the results from the die roll task, subjects were explained that their counterparts have 
also made their choice of die size and rolling space. Dictators can then choose to either overlook 
the randomness in the role assignment and attribute it to their skill in picking the size and space 
with the best odds or acknowledge the task to be completely random and treat it as such. Which 
way they go will of course be determined through comparing the behavior in this treatment with 
the behavior in the control and the real entitlement treatment, which in turn will help us gauge the 
general willingness to take advantage of this situation to escape from the social norm and justify a 
self-serving bias for payoff-maximizing behavior. Participants in the control group were kept for 
                                               
6 Subjects were aware of the nature of the environment associated with the open and closed space options 
before making their decision between them. 
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a few minutes prior to playing the dictator game. This was done in order to balance the participation 
duration for subjects across all treatments. On average, the amount of time taken to complete the 
general knowledge quiz was 10 minutes, which was similar to the time it took to conduct the die 
roll task. Following the dictator game, subjects filled out a short demographics survey, after which 
they privately received their payments in a sealed envelope and were escorted out of the session. 
In order to elicit the social norms associated with the three treatments in this study, an 
incentivized survey was conducted on a different sample of subjects within the same population. 
A total of 908 subjects completed the survey, where each was randomly presented with one of the 
three scenarios pertaining to the three treatments. The survey then asked the subject to rate the 
social appropriateness of each action available to the dictator in the experiment. Since dictators 
were allowed to give any amount between $0 and $10 in $0.5 increments, there are a total of 21 
possible actions. Participants provided their ratings on a four-point scale, following Krupka and 
Weber (2013). Specifically, the options were “very socially inappropriate”, “somewhat socially 
inappropriate”, “somewhat social appropriate”, and “very socially appropriate”. Similar to Krupka 
and Weber (2013), a value of −1, −1/3, 1/3, and 1 respectively was assigned to each 
classification. Hence, the social appropriateness of an action is bounded between −1 for the most 
socially inappropriate act and 1 for the most socially appropriate act. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
This section includes a description of the main hypotheses regarding compliance with social 
norms. The theoretical model entails a decision maker choosing one action +<  from a finite set of 
possible actions • = {+1, … , +®}. We adopt the framework used by Krupka and Weber (2013) to 
define the decision maker’s utility function over a certain action as: "(+<) = 9D™(+<)E + ;_(+<) (23) 
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where the first term on the right-hand side represents the utility derived from the payoff associated 
with the action and the second term stands for the utility (disutility) resulting from choosing a 
socially appropriate (inappropriate) action. Specifically, the function _(+<) is directly 
proportional to the social appropriateness of action +<  and can take any value in the interval [−1, 1]. The sign of _(+<)  indicates the general appropriateness or inappropriateness of the 
action, where _(+<) > 0 if +<  represents socially prescribed behavior and _(+<) < 0 if +<  
represents socially proscribed behavior. Moreover, the degree of appropriateness 
(inappropriateness) of the action is reflected in the magnitude of _(+<), such that _(+<)  becomes 
more positive (negative) the more appropriate (inappropriate) the action is perceived. 
In the basic model of Krupka and Weber (2013), the parameter ; represents the degree to 
which decision makers care about complying with social norms. While this model does a great job 
in explaining the subject-specific portion of social norm compliance, it does not account for the 
situation-specific part. That is, it does not tell us how the value placed on social norm compliance 
changes under different situations (i.e., treatments). Hence, we extend the original model of 
Krupka and Weber (2013) in order to incorporate the perception of social norm compliance as 
either a first impulse or last resort. This is done using the additional assumption that the parameter ; might depend on the decision maker’s ability to justify deviations from the social norm. 
Intuitively, it is reasonable to think that the importance people place on compliance with a certain 
social norm will likely depend on how well they can justify nonadherence to it. In other words, 
individuals might not care as much about adhering to a specific social norm if they think they have 
a valid excuse for deviating from it. Let ´ be an indicator variable of whether the context allows 
for an interpretation that the decision maker can use to break the social norm (i.e., ´ = 1 if an 
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alternative interpretation exists and ´ = 0 otherwise), then our additional assumption can be 
written as ; = ;(´) and the model becomes: 
 "(+<) = 9D™(+<)E + ;(´)_(+<). (24) 
  
In the conventional dictator game (control treatment), where role assignment is explicitly 
random, there are clear social norms against giving zero and towards giving half the endowment 
as shown by Krupka and Weber (2013). Moreover, this setting does not allow the individual to 
form an interpretation to escape these norms (i.e., ´ = 0). In this case, the decision maker's utility 
function takes the form: 
 "(+<) = 9D™(+<)E + ;(0)_(+<). (25) 
  
Conversely, in the fake entitlement treatment, where role assignment is implicitly random but open 
for interpretation, the utility function takes the form: 
 "(+<) = 9D™(+<)E + ;(1)_(+<). (26) 
  
The utility function in the real entitlement treatment takes the same form as the fake entitlement 
treatment since even if social norms existed for an equal split, the setting obviously justifies selfish 
behavior. 
Given this framework, the hypotheses regarding the perception of social norm compliance 
as a first impulse or last resort can be stated in terms of the relationship between  ;(0) and ;(1). 
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Hypothesis 1 (Social Norms as a First Impulse) 
Giving rates in the fake entitlement treatment will be similar to the conventional dictator game 
(control treatment) and significantly higher than the real entitlement treatment (!. S. , ;(0) =;(1) > 0). 
The first hypothesis supports the perception of social norms as a first impulse. This means 
that the individuals’ primary inclination is to determine the socially appropriate course of action 
regardless of whether or not they see an opportunity to justify self-centered behavior. Hence, they 
will overlook the possibility of favorable interpretation in the fake entitlement treatment and treat 
role assignment as completely random. 
Hypothesis 2 (Social Norms as a Last Resort) 
Giving rates in the fake entitlement treatment will be significantly lower than the conventional 
dictator game (control treatment) and similar to the real entitlement treatment D!. S. , ;(0) > 0 ≥;(1)E. 
This hypothesis is more in line with the argument that compliance with social norms is 
considered a last resort. That is, individuals will behave in accordance with social norms only in 
the absence of a self-serving bias that can maximize their payoffs. Hence, subjects will take 
advantage of the situation in the fake entitlement treatment to vindicate their low giving rates. 
Hypothesis 3 (Social Norms as a Dual Perception) 
Giving rates in the fake entitlement treatment will be significantly lower than the conventional 
dictator game (control treatment) and significantly higher than the real entitlement treatment (!. S. , ;(0) > ;(1) > 0). 
The third hypothesis accommodates a dual perception of social norm compliance in the 
society as both a first impulse and a last resort. In this case, there would be a significant proportion 
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of the population on either side of the spectrum. Some will recognize the randomness and give 
high amounts in the fake entitlement treatment, while others will hide behind the interpretability 
of the environment and give low amounts. 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Analyzing Giving Behavior 
 
3.4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 provides summary statistics of dictator giving for each treatment. A bar graph displaying 
the average level of giving by treatment is also presented in Figure 3. 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Dictator Giving by Treatment 
 
 
Result 1. Giving in the conventional dictator game (control treatment) conforms with the 
general finding in the literature. 
 
As seen in Table 6 and Figure 3, individual giving levels in the control group ranged from 
$0 to $5, with a median of $4. More importantly, average giving in the control was around $3.4. 
This result is in line with the literature, where average giving rates constitute around 30% in the 
standard version of the dictator game. In fact, a t-test shows that average giving in our control 
group was not statistically different from $3 (c = 0.258).  
 
Result 2. Consistent with Hoffman et al. (1994), giving rates decrease substantially when 
dictator roles are earned by merit. 
 
There was a significant reduction in average giving between the control group and real 
entitlement treatment (Mann-Whitney test, c = 0.002), where average giving in the latter dropped 
to $1.68. In order to confirm the significance of this result, we apply the multiple hypothesis testing 
algorithm proposed in theorem 3.1 of List et al. (2016). Adapted to this study, the procedure by 
List et al. (2016) ensures a minimal chance of false positives when testing multiple treatment 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev.
Control 0 5 4 3.39 1.87
Real Entitlement 0 5 1 1.68 1.84
Fake Entitlement 0 5 1.5 1.79 1.79
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effects (in this case the real and fake entitlement treatments). The result is robust to this procedure, 
where average giving in the real entitlement treatment is still significantly lower than the control 
(multiplicity adjusted test by List, c = 0.001). As expected, it seems that earning the right to 
become the dictator, by outperforming the counterpart in the general knowledge quiz, instills a 
sense of ownership over the endowment which dilutes the social stigma associated with 
unwillingness to share and removes the social norm towards giving generous amounts. 
Interestingly, average giving in the fake entitlement treatment was substantially lower than 
the control (Mann-Whitney test, c = 0.003; multiplicity adjusted test by List, c = 0.005). At a 
level of $1.79, it more closely resembled behavior in the real entitlement treatment (Mann-Whitney 
test, c = 0.704; multiplicity adjusted test by List c = 0.797), which indicates that role assignment 
in the fake entitlement treatment was treated as if it was genuinely based on skill. This result 
provides evidence favoring the view of social norms as a last resort. It seems that the mere 
introduction of a more flexible interpretation of role assignment was enough to induce subjects to 
give less, as they would clearly do if their ownership of the endowment was truly deserved.  
The same result is illustrated in Figure 4, which plots the histogram of giving by treatment. 
While there were a few instances where subjects kept the entire endowment in the control group, 
they only accounted for around 16% of the observations, with more than 40% giving the fair share 
of half their endowment. In fact, around 70% of subjects gave $3 or more in the control group. On 
the other hand, the histograms of the real and fake entitlement treatments are clearly shifted to the 
left compared to the control, where the frequency of $5 transfers decreases by half in both cases. 
The majority of subjects in the real and fake entitlement treatments gave an amount less than or 
equal to $2, with more than 30% giving zero in each treatment. Based on a K-S test, the distribution  




Figure 4. Histogram of Dictator Giving by Treatment 
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Table 7. Summary of the Social Norm Measures Across Treatments 
 
 
Action Mean - - - + + + Mean - - - + + + Mean - - - + + + C vs. T1 C vs. T2 T1 vs. T2
Give $0 -5.4 55% 28% 10% 7% -0.54 54% 28% 13% 5% -0.55 57% 25% 12% 6% 0.907 0.924 0.833
Give $0.5 -6.7 64% 25% 7% 4% -0.68 62% 30% 6% 2% -0.67 64% 27% 6% 3% 0.786 0.931 0.856
Give $1 -0.53 48% 37% 11% 4% -0.47 42% 38% 17% 3% -0.51 46% 39% 11% 4% 0.119 0.569 0.332
Give $1.5 -0.49 45% 39% 12% 4% -0.42 40% 38% 19% 3% -0.47 41% 42% 14% 3% 0.129 0.577 0.333
Give $2 -0.28 27% 45% 22% 6% -0.19 24% 39% 29% 8% -0.25 27% 43% 21% 9% 0.050 0.476 0.235
Give $2.5 -0.3 25% 48% 23% 4% -0.21 21% 46% 27% 6% -0.28 23% 49% 24% 4% 0.035 0.611 0.111
Give $3 -0.17 19% 43% 31% 7% -0.01 11% 41% 36% 12% -0.11 14% 46% 33% 7% 0.001 0.183 0.031
Give $3.5 -0.1 13% 47% 31% 9% 0.04 8% 38% 45% 9% -0.1 13% 45% 34% 8% 0.001 0.898 0.002
Give $4 0.2 5% 28% 49% 18% 0.31 3% 19% 56% 22% 0.23 4% 25% 53% 18% 0.005 0.408 0.046
Give $4.5 0.26 5% 22% 52% 21% 0.37 3% 16% 53% 28% 0.27 6% 23% 46% 25% 0.010 0.854 0.023
Give $5 0.87 1% 2% 12% 85% 0.85 0% 4% 14% 82% 0.85 2% 2% 13% 83% 0.606 0.614 0.981
Give $5.5 0.62 2% 8% 34% 56% 0.46 4% 15% 40% 41% 0.54 4% 11% 36% 49% 0.000 0.046 0.096
Give $6 0.54 3% 9% 40% 48% 0.41 4% 18% 40% 38% 0.46 5% 13% 40% 42% 0.002 0.047 0.288
Give $6.5 0.42 5% 16% 40% 39% 0.24 7% 29% 36% 28% 0.33 7% 21% 37% 35% 0.000 0.080 0.061
Give $7 0.39 6% 19% 34% 41% 0.2 8% 33% 30% 29% 0.27 10% 24% 31% 35% 0.000 0.019 0.183
Give $7.5 0.3 9% 23% 32% 36% 0.08 14% 36% 25% 25% 0.19 15% 25% 26% 34% 0.000 0.052 0.068
Give $8 0.29 12% 21% 30% 37% 0.08 17% 30% 26% 27% 0.17 18% 23% 25% 34% 0.000 0.047 0.111
Give $8.5 0.21 16% 23% 24% 37% -0.03 25% 28% 23% 24% 0.09 24% 20% 25% 31% 0.000 0.063 0.051
Give $9 0.18 20% 18% 26% 36% -0.07 31% 22% 23% 24% 0.09 27% 18% 21% 34% 0.000 0.145 0.015
Give $9.5 0.12 25% 16% 24% 35% -0.14 37% 21% 19% 23% 0.01 31% 18% 19% 32% 0.000 0.091 0.022
Give 10 0.25 24% 11% 20% 45% -0.03 36% 15% 18% 31% 0.12 31% 11% 16% 41% 0.000 0.057 0.029
Control Group (C) Real Entitlement (T1) Fake Entitlement (T2)
Explicit Random Assignment (n = 306) Explicit Merit-Based Assignment (N = 308) Implicit Random Assignment (n = 293)
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of giving in the control group was significantly different from the one in the fake entitlement (" =0.007) and real entitlement (" = 0.000) treatments. However, the same test failed to detect a  
significant difference between the distributions of the fake and real entitlement treatments (" =0.136). 
3.4.1.2 Theoretical Model Estimation 
We now estimate the parameters +(0) and +(1) to provide a more rigorous test of the hypotheses 
concerning the perception of social norm compliance. Estimation of these parameters was done 
using the social norm measures obtained from the incentivized survey for each treatment. Table 7 
summarizes those measures. As can be seen, giving half the endowment seems to be the most 
socially appropriate act in all treatments. Moreover, giving less than $3 is viewed as socially 
inappropriate for all treatments, since ,(-.) was negative for those amounts. While the norms in 
the control and fake entitlement were almost identical, the real entitlement differed in that social 
norms dropped drastically for amounts higher the $5. 
 




Payoff (  ) 1.253 *** 2.174 *** 1.515 ***
(0.242) (0.390) (0.296)
Social Appropriateness (  ) 5.103 *** -1.015 *** -2.712 ***
(0.822) (0.353) (0.559)
Observations 651 651 609
Log Likelihood -63.505 -57.154 -59.659
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Control Group Real Entitlement Fake Entitlement
!
"
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Result 3. Individuals have a tendency for utilizing a self-serving bias that can help them 
escape unfavorable social norms, meaning that compliance with social norms, at least as far as 
the behavior of dictators is concerned, seems more like a last resort. 
 
Table 8 presents the parameter estimates across the three treatments using the social norms 
presented in table 7. A conditional logit model was estimated where the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable of whether the subject selected the action. As expected, the parameter on the 
payoff is positive and significant for all treatments, which reasonably implies that individuals 
derive a positive utility from higher monetary rewards. More importantly, while the coefficient 
estimate on the social norms variable was positive and significant for the control treatment, it was 
negative and significant for both the real and fake entitlement treatments. This means that 
individuals were placing a high importance on social norm compliance only in the control 
treatment, when there was no possible justification for breaking the norm. However, they do not 
seem to care about compliance when the justification becomes available. This illustrates the 
extension to the model presented by Krupka and Weber (2013), as it shows that the parameter + is 
in fact situation-specific. The fact that social norm compliance was not important in the real 
entitlement treatment cannot be taken as evidence towards either view (first impulse or last resort), 
since it can be argued that the behavior in this treatment is driven by the perception that the 
endowment was fairly deserved. However, seeing that it is also not important in the fake 
entitlement treatment stands as clear evidence supporting the view of social norm compliance as a 
last resort.    
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3.4.1.3 Robustness Check 
The robustness of our findings is demonstrated by estimating several Tobit regression 
specifications, which captured the effect of both treatments on average giving. As shown in Table 
9, the specification in the first column investigated the relationship using indicator variables for 
the two treatments as the only explanatory variables, while the one in column 2 controlled for 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Column 3 included the two treatment variables 
along with the variables labeled “die roll difference” and “quiz score difference”, which, as the 
names imply, measure the difference in the die roll and quiz score between subject pairs in the fake 
entitlement and real entitlement treatments respectively. The idea behind those variables is to 
evaluate whether dictators have a tendency to adjust their decisions based on how much they have 
outperformed their counterparts in the role assignment task. For example, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that dictators might be inclined to give more when the receiver’s performance is comparable 
to theirs as opposed to when it is far worse.7 Finally, the specification in the fourth column 
combines all the variables in the first three regressions. 
Results from Table 9 tell a very similar story to the one described based on the analysis 
presented so far. The coefficients on the two treatment variables were negative and significant 
across all specifications, implying that there was indeed a sizable decrease in giving in the fake 
entitlement and real entitlement treatments compared to the control. Similar to the previous 
analysis, we can also see that the coefficient on the real entitlement dummy was slightly more 
negative than the one associated with the fake entitlement dummy, although the difference was not 
statistically significant in any of the specifications. Interestingly, all the other coefficients were not 
                                               
7 One can also argue for the opposite scenario, where the dictator might choose to give more when the 
performance differential is higher out of pity, for example. 
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statistically different from zero. This indicates that the average level of giving did not significantly 
differ across gender, school year, or income level. But more importantly, it also means that the 
level of giving was not really tied to the performance differential in the role assignment task. In 
other words, how well the receiver performed in comparison with the dictator was irrelevant to the 
latter when making his transfer decision. In some sense, this result is supportive of the idea that 
dictators were treating social norms as a last resort and were trying to find any means that can 
rationalize self-interested behavior. No matter how close their counterpart’s performance was to 
theirs, the fact that they received a higher score on the test, or had a higher die roll, was enough to 
instill a sense of entitlement to the endowment, which they can use to justify their low giving rates. 
 
Table 9. Tobit Regressions of the Effect of Real and Fake Entitlement on Dictator Giving 
 
Notes: The data contained a total of 19 left-censored observations. No right-censoring was necessary since no one 
chose to transfer the maximum amount allowable. Hence, a left-censored Tobit is sufficient to account for censored 
observations. Considering the significance of sigma under all specifications, a Tobit regression generates significantly 
different estimates compared to an OLS regression. Significance levels:  *:10%     **:5%     ***1%. 
Variable
Constant 3.216 *** 3.597 *** 3.216 *** 3.697 ***
(0.424) (1.213) (0.423) (1.238)
Fake Entitlement -1.870 *** -1.976 *** -1.977 * -2.133 **
(0.618) (0.641) (1.018) (1.042)
Real Entitlement -2.016 *** -2.107 *** -2.456 ** -2.469 **
(0.609) (0.624) (1.148) (1.209)
Male -0.139 -0.152
(0.522) (0.530)
Schoold Year -0.148 -0.159
(0.289) (0.291)
Low Income 0.465 0.397
(0.706) (0.729)
Medium Income -0.280 -0.339
(0.850) (0.863)
Die Roll Difference 0.045 0.066
(0.342) (0.345)
Quiz Score Difference 0.227 0.183
(0.501) (0.520)
Sigma 2.324 *** 2.301 *** 2.321 *** 2.299 ***
(0.215) (0.213) (0.215) (0.213)
Observations 91 91 91 91
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3.4.1.4 Double Hurdle Model 
The analysis presented so far provides compelling evidence favoring the notion that social norms 
are not the first course of action sought by dictators. However, it might be argued that the treatment 
effects may be skewed due to the presence of “non-givers”, who are individuals that transfer zero 
under all circumstances and not just as a result of the presented treatments. If a significant fraction 
of non-givers existed, the resulting treatment effects might be overestimated since a portion of the 
decrease in the average giving in the real entitlement and fake entitlement treatments could be 
attributed to their presence. 
We address this issue by constructing a double hurdle model to obtain more conservative 
estimates of the treatment effects. The model enables us to isolate the effect of the two treatments 
from the effect of the presence of non-givers. Specifically, it assumes two different classifications 
of individuals: givers and non-givers.8 Givers are individuals whose behavior is driven by the 
prevailing social norms, while non-givers are individuals who always transfer zero regardless of 
the circumstances they face. Considering the significant clustering at zero in all treatments, and 
the fact that givers might also elect to transfer zero in some cases, the double hurdle model was 
applied within the framework of Tobit regressions.9 Let / represent the proportion of the 
population who are givers, so that the proportion of non-givers is 1 − /. While the latter group is 
automatically assumed to give zero, the behavior of the former can be modeled using the following 
equation: 
 
                                               
8 In a double hurdle model, positive transfers are made upon passing two separate hurdles. The _rst puts 
the subject in the category of givers as opposed to non-givers. Then, conditional on being of the giver type, 
he/she may still elect to transfer zero but can also transfer a positive amount. 
9 Only leftward censoring was applied since there were no observations at the upper limit of $10. 
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12∗ = 4256 + 82 (27) 
  
where 12∗ is the desired level of giving, 425 is a vector of explanatory variables, and 82 ∼ ,(0, ;<) 
is the error term. While 12∗ can take any value on the real numbers line (an individual may desire 
to give any amount he wants), the actual amount that can be given, 12, is restricted between $0 and 
$10 in the dictator game. Hence, the relationship between desired transfers and actual transfers is 
given by: 
  
y> = ?0									if	y>∗ ≤ 0y>∗							if	y>∗ > 0 (28) 
  
Given the above framework, the log likelihood function can be represented as: 
 
log l = HIIKLMNln P1 − pΦIx>5βσ VW + IKLXNln Pp 1σϕIy> − x>5βσ VWVZ>M[  (29) 
  
Using this model will guarantee estimates that are not contaminated by the presence of non-givers 
and more accurately capture the true treatment effects. Moreover, it also allows estimation of the 
fraction of individuals belonging to each type. 
Table 10 presents the results from the double hurdle model estimation. Around 20.5% of 
subjects fell in the category of non-givers, with the remaining 79.5% classified as givers. The 
average treatment effect estimates are negative and significant. They are also very similar in 
magnitude to the estimates presented in Table 9. This strengthens our conclusion that dictators in 
the fake entitlement treatment were taking advantage of the situation and behaving as if the results 
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of the task were based on their own skill, implying that subjects would readily try to escape from 
the obligation of complying with social norms rather than impulsively seeking those norms as their 
first course of action. 
 
Table 10. Structural Model to Separate the Treatment Effects from Pure Non-Giving Behavior 
 
Notes: The number of observations was 91 and the log likelihood ratio -172.470. Significance levels:  *:10%     
**:5%     ***1%. 
 
 
3.4.2  Analyzing Receiver Expectations of Giving Behavior 
3.4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As mentioned before, the receivers were required to state how much they expect the dictator will 
transfer to them. They were free to choose any value between $0 and $10 in $0.5 increments. Panel 
a of Figure 5 shows the average receiver expectation by treatment, while panel b plots the same 
bars alongside actual dictator giving from Figure 3. Summary statistics of receiver expectations by 
treatment are also given in Table 11. 
 
Result 4. Receivers invoked social norms when asked to state their beliefs regarding how 
much the dictators will transfer to them, indicating that the perception of social norms as a first 
impulse or last resort is made in the way that generates the more favorable outcome to the 
individual. 
 
Parameter 4.012 *** -1.757 *** -1.934 *** 1.663 *** 0.795 ***
Std. Error (0.333) (0.554) (0.549) (0.194) (0.059)
Constant Fake Entitlement Real Entitlement Sigma P_Giver
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Figure 5. Average Dictator Giving and Receiver Expectation by Treatment 
 
 
Table 11. Summary Statistics of Receiver Expectations by Treatment 
 
 
As we can see, receivers in the control group and the real entitlement treatment were 
relatively accurate regarding how much they expected to receive from the dictators. In fact, there 
was no statistically significant difference between average dictator giving and average receiver 
expectation in those two treatments (Mann-Whitney test, " > 0.174), although expectations 
slightly exceeded giving in both cases. Interestingly, receiver expectations in the fake entitlement 
treatment more closely resembled expectations in the control group, contrary to actual giving 
behavior in this treatment which was closer to behavior in the real entitlement treatment. A 
comparison of average expectations across treatments reveals that the difference between the 
control and fake entitlement treatment was statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney test, " =0.560; multiplicity adjusted test by List, " = 0.545), while average expectations in the real 
Variable Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev.
Control 0 7.5 5 4.02 1.65
Real Entitlement 0 6 2 2.29 1.92
Fake Entitlement 0 7 5 3.74 1.83
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entitlement treatment were significantly lower than the control (Mann-Whitney test, " = 0.001; 
multiplicity adjusted test by List, " = 0.000) and the fake entitlement treatment (Mann-Whitney 
test, " = 0.003; multiplicity adjusted test by List, " = 0.01). Moreover, average expectations 
were significantly higher than average giving in the fake entitlement treatment (Mann-Whitney 
test, " = 0.000). 
The same result can be seen from the histograms of average expectations of dictator giving 
by treatment, which are plotted in Figure 6. As shown in the figure, the distribution of average 
expectations was very similar in the control group and fake entitlement treatment, where the 
majority of subjects reported expectations of half the endowment and only around 10% expected 
to receive nothing in both cases. A K-S test failed to detect any significant differences between the 
control and fake entitlement treatment (" = 0.893). On the other hand, it is clear that the 
distribution of expectations was significantly shifted to the left in the real entitlement treatment, 
which was bimodal at $0 and $2 with only around 15% expecting to receive half the endowment. 
Based on a K-S test, this distribution was significantly different from the control group (" =0.004) and the fake entitlement treatment (" = 0.03). The results above indicate that receivers 
advocated the perception of social norms as a first impulse when responding to how much they 
think the dictators would transfer. So, while winners in the die roll task behaved as if they were 
convinced of their superior performance, losers were able to see beyond the ambiguity of the task 
and correctly attributed the performance of both parties to luck. We conclude that individuals form 
their perception of social norm compliance based on a self-serving bias towards the more favorable 
outcome. That is, while dictators were prompted to interpret the results of the die roll task in a way 
that helps them escape the social obligation of making sizable positive transfers, receivers found 
  59 
themselves in a disadvantageous position under this interpretation and so were predisposed to call 
upon social norms when asked to guess how much they will be receiving. 
3.4.2.2 Robustness Checks 
Tobit regressions were estimated to further analyze the effect of the two treatments on average 
receiver expectations. The results are displayed in Table 12 using the same specifications as in 
Table 9. Consistent with the results in the previous subsection, the coefficient on the fake 
entitlement variable was not statistically significant, while the one associated with the real 
entitlement variable was negative and significant across all specifications. As noted earlier, this 
implies that average expectations were similar in the control and fake entitlement treatment and 
were significantly higher than average expectations in the real entitlement treatment. Again, none 
of the other coefficients were significant, which indicates that receiver expectations did not depend 
on gender, school year, income level, or performance differential in the role assignment tasks. The 
insignificance of the coefficients associated with the “die roll difference” and “quiz score 
difference” variables highlights an interesting point that is worth noting. It seems that no matter 
how much worse receivers did in the die roll task relative to the dictators, they still held the general 
view that dictators are expected to follow the social norm and make sizable positive transfers. On 
the other hand, when the task was unquestionably linked to merit, as is the case in the real 
entitlement treatment, the social stigma against giving nothing was diluted and receivers correctly 
expected that dictators will make very small transfers, if any, no matter how close their scores 
were on the general knowledge quiz. 
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Figure 6. Histogram of Expectations of Dictator Giving by Treatment
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Table 12. Tobit Regressions of the Effect of Real and Fake Entitlement on Receiver Expectation 
 
Notes: The data contained a total of 14 left-censored observations. No right censoring was necessary since no one 
expected to receive the maximum amount allowable. Hence, a left-censored Tobit is sufficient to account for censored 
observations. Considering the significance of sigma under all specifications, a Tobit regression generates significantly 





While the model presented by Krupka and Weber (2013) was very useful in explaining various 
results from previous investigations with dictator games, our extended model takes us one step 
further to painting a complete picture that can fully explain how individuals interact with, and are 
influenced by, social norms. In light of the evidence that ! is dependent on ", the parameter !(") 
in our model can be interpreted as how likely individuals believe they can not comply with social 
Variable
Constant 3.966 *** 3.080 *** 3.966 *** 3.111 ***
(0.370) (0.824) (0.368) (0.824)
Fake Entitlement -0.309 -0.247 0.281 0.108
(0.533) (0.536) (0.867) (0.864)
Real Entitlement -1.993 *** -1.845 *** -2.157 ** -2.236 **
(0.531) (0.528) (0.983) (0.969)
Male 0.721 0.710
(0.434) (0.450)
Schoold Year 0.155 0.152
(0.220) (0.219)
Low Income 0.014 -0.006
(0.526) (0.526)
Medium Income -0.090 -0.121
(0.655) (0.656)
Die Roll Difference 0.252 0.151
(0.293) (0.295)
Quiz Score Difference -0.086 -0.202
(0.429) (0.430)
Sigma 2.051 *** 2.009 *** 2.041 *** 2.002 ***
(0.173) (0.170) (0.172) 0.169
Observations 91 91 91 91
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norms without hurting their social image. In this regard, our simple extension will strengthen the 
model of Krupka and Weber (2013) as it can be used to rationalize responses to treatments that 
were not accounted for in the original model. 
It can be argued that most of the treatment manipulations that were previously done in 
dictator games have either changed the structure of social norms (the %(&') variable) or the weight 
individuals place on compliance with those norms (the  !(") parameter). We will discuss a few 
examples in this section starting with the double-blind treatment introduced by Hoffman et al. 
(1994), where the actions of the dictator are concealed from other participants as well as the 
experimenters. As shown by the authors, giving rates are substantially lower in this treatment 
compared to the conventional dictator game. While the social norm structure did not change in this 
case, as dictators were assigned randomly and did not deserve nor earn the endowment, the 
importance of complying with those norms has changed. In this case, there are no social 
consequences associated with keeping the entire endowment since no one will know who gave 
what. This removes the social stigma associated with the payoff- maximizing strategy, which in 
turn entices more people to give lower amounts. 
A very similar argument can be made regarding treatments that obscured the dictator's 
decision using randomized response techniques (Franzen and Pointner, 2012) and treatments that 
used asymmetric information such that the receiver did not know where the money received came 
from (Dana et al., 2006). In both cases, the parameter !(")  significantly decreased as the dictator’s 
ability to get away with giving low rates with no social consequences was enhanced. The examples 
above highlight situations where our extended model can prove useful in fully explaining how 
interaction with social norms affects giving in dictator games. 
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Finally, our extended model does a good job in explaining changes in behavior driven by 
social framing treatments, where the wording of the task changes to either encourage or discourage 
giving (Ellingsen et al., 2012; Dreber et al., 2013). Consistent with Dreber et al. (2013), we argue 
that the effect of social frames on behavior arrives from changes in the utility function rather than 
changes in beliefs. However, it is possible that those treatments are changing both the social norms 
structure and the importance placed on social norm compliance. For instance, framing the dictator 
game as the “giving game” versus the “keeping game”, as done by Dreber et al. (2013), can change 
the perception of the most appropriate amount to give and/or how likely dictators think they can 
justify low giving rates. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Previous investigations of giving in dictator games have reported consistent deviations from 
economic theory in the sense that individuals make transfers well above the optimal strategy 
prescribed by Nash equilibrium. A number of theoretical models have been proposed to account 
for this kind of behavior including several which argued for a philanthropic tendency as the driving 
force. 
One explanation that was able to outperform the traditional philanthropic models and is 
robust to various experimental manipulations and findings holds compliance with social norms as 
the main motive governing the significant positive contributions in dictator games. This notion 
was supported by several studies and is advocated by many researchers as the most accurate 
rationalization for the observed behavior (Hoffman et al., 1996; Bolton et al., 1998; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2013). Yet, little is known about the nature with which 
subjects perceive and interact with these social norms. 
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This study addresses an important question that provides a better understanding of the 
dynamic relationship through which compliance with social norms influences behavior in dictator 
games, and similar social settings. By varying the presence of a social stigma against selfish 
behavior, we were able to determine whether individuals considered adherence to social norms as 
a first impulse or a last resort. This was done using three treatments: 1) control, where role 
assignment was explicitly random; 2) real entitlement treatment, where role assignment was 
explicitly based on merit; and 3) fake entitlement treatment, where role assignment was implicitly 
random but open for interpretation. 
A rigorous investigation of behavior across the three treatments provided compelling 
evidence that social norms are not a course of action that is impulsively sought by individuals 
facing a situation similar to the one in a dictator game. Instead, we observe that subjects were keen 
on forming an interpretation that served their own self-interest in the fake entitlement treatment, 
indicating that adherence to social norms, at least within the framework presented here, is 
something that individuals are forced into when they fail to justify self-centered, payoff-
maximizing behavior. 
The findings presented here can be useful in reconciling much of the divergence between 
theory and laboratory behavior. Moreover, our notion can be used to more accurately anticipate 
when we should observe violations of Nash equilibrium in dictator games. Our study can also 
prove useful as a starting point for providing charities and other fund-raising agencies with 
valuable recommendations that can help improve their performance. By developing a thorough 
understanding of the way with which social norms interact with and affect the average person’s 
giving behavior, institutions can start developing optimal environments to enhance their efficiency 
and generate more donations. As a concluding remark, we reiterate the words of List (2007) that 
  65 
further investigations are clearly needed to unravel more of the underlying forces that shape 
behavior in this setting. We hope that our paper promotes further applications of this notion under 
different environments to provide a more complete understanding of the full extent of the role that 
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CHAPTER IV 
HAPPY TO TAKE SOME RISK: A MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE 
DEPENDENCE OF RISK PREFERENCES ON MOOD USING BIOMETRIC DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Our mood plays an important role in determining our daily behavior. It influences how we perceive 
and interact with our surrounding environment. In fact, we spend the majority of our lives in a 
constant state of changing moods. When we go to work, make business decisions, invest in 
retirement, or decide what type of insurance to purchase, we seldom do so in a state of neutral 
affect. We often make decisions under varying positive and negative moods and it is reasonable to 
believe that our affective state has an influence on our decision-making process. 
Although very little attention has been initially placed on investigating emotions, they have 
become widely recognized by researchers as a key factor affecting individual cognition and 
behavior. For instance, Isen (2008) has linked positive affect with enhanced cognitive flexibility, 
while Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) argued that it decreases the time value for present utility (i.e., 
individuals experiencing a pleasant mood tend to be more patient in intertemporal decisions). 
Positive affect has also been shown to increase reciprocity (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006), work effort 
(Erez and Isen, 2005), and productivity (Erez and Isen, 2005). On the other hand, negative affect 
was found to increase self-perceived emotional eating (Bekker et al., 2004), willingness-to-pay for 
market goods (Lerner et al., 2004; Cryder et al., 2008), to decrease job satisfaction (Brief et al., 
1995), time preference for present utility (Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013) and altruism in dictator 
and ultimatum games (Capra, 2004).  
Considering the importance economists place on understanding individual decision-
making under uncertainty, and the relevance of these decisions in our everyday life, a great deal 
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of attention has been placed on investigating the effect of emotions on risk preferences (Drichoutis 
and Nayga, 2013; Kliger and Levy, 2003; Isen and Geva, 1987; Arkes et al., 1988; Fehr-Duda et 
al., 2011; Yuen and Lee, 2003). However, the mechanism through which emotions influence how 
individuals form decisions under risk is still a subject of debate. In fact, there is a longstanding 
controversy regarding the direction of the effect of positive and negative moods on risk 
preferences, with two opposing hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis, mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH), argues that individuals 
experiencing a positive mood will act to maintain this pleasant experience. This will cause them 
to refrain from engaging in risky behavior in order to avoid losses that could negatively alter their 
current mood state. Hence, according to the MMH, positive mood increases risk-aversion and vice 
versa (Isen and Patrick, 1983). On the other hand, the second hypothesis, affect generalization 
hypothesis or affect infusion model (AIM), posits that individuals are more likely to fixate on the 
positive aspects of a risky situation when experiencing a positive mood. This will drive decision-
makers to put a higher weight on large positive outcomes, which will ultimately lead them to 
choose riskier alternatives. Hence, according to the AIM, positive mood decreases risk-aversion 
and vice versa (Johnson and Tversky, 1983). 
With completely opposite predictions, the controversy between the MMH and AIM is 
fueled by a large body of evidence supporting both models. While results supporting the MMH 
have long been reported in the literature (Isen and Patrick, 1983; Arkes et al.,1988; Mano, 1992; 
Nygren et al., 1996; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Kring, 2000), there are numerous studies 
that have strongly advocated the AIM (Lerner et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2012; Spies et al., 1997; 
Nguyen and Noussair, 2014). Furthermore, some studies have produced mixed evidence in favor 
of both models (Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013), while others have reported an insignificant effect of 
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mood on risk preferences (Yuen and Lee, 2003). The main purpose of this chapter is to utilize 
biometric data to provide a better understanding of the full extent of the effect of mood on risk-
taking behavior. In doing so, we test for differences in the treatment effects under different risk 
preference elicitation tasks, namely, the Holt and Laury (2002) task (HL) and the Eckel Grossman 
(2002) task (EG). Moreover, by using facial expression analysis technology to directly observe 
emotions, we highlight a potential shortcoming in the traditional experimental designs used for 
tackling this topic. This in turn provides a more accurate test of the two hypotheses mentioned 
above. 
The commonly adopted procedure for studying emotions in the laboratory is to conduct a 
three-stage design (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011; Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013; Treffers et al., 
2012). In the first stage, the participants are induced with their respective moods based on their 
treatment assignment. This is usually done using short videos, reading mood inducing passages, 
mood-related memory elicitation, and experience of success/failure (Capra et al., 2004; Capra et 
al., 2010; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006). The subjects’ moods are then elicited in the second stage 
(mood measurement stage) in order to validate the success of the mood inducement. Mood 
elicitation in the second stage is usually done using self-reported surveys, where the predominant 
survey is the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). In the PANAS, subjects answer a 
list of questions regarding the extent on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) to 
which they are feeling various positive and negative moods. The answers are aggregated for each 
subject in order to determine his valence (net positive or negative affect). Finally, subjects 
complete the risk task (or some other task of interest) in the third stage. We argue that this design 
is problematic and might result in biased estimates of the effect of mood on risk preferences. The 
main issue is that this procedure in its current form requires subjects to complete an additional task 
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(mood elicitation survey) between mood inducement and risk elicitation. Considering the cognitive 
effort imposed by this additional task, and the fact that it is relatively lengthy relative to the short 
mood inducement, the subjects’ induced mood might become diluted by the time they complete 
the survey and are ready to start the risk preference elicitation task.10 We conjecture that this 
“dilution effect” might in turn attenuate or otherwise bias the treatment effects of interest.  
In this chapter, we use facial expression analysis to test for the significance of the dilution 
effect and to help overcome this issue. While testing the effect of positive and negative moods on 
risk preferences, we further divide our subjects into two groups. The first group, hereafter diluted 
group, followed the conventional three-stage design described above. Conversely, the second 
group, hereafter undiluted group, completed stages 2 and 3 in the opposite order. This group was 
presented with the risk preference elicitation tasks (HL and EG) directly following mood 
inducement, after which they were asked to complete the PANAS survey. In order to maintain an 
accurate measure of the success of mood inducement for both groups, facial expression analysis 
was utilized to measure subjects’ moods during mood inducement and right before they started the 
risk preference tasks. It is worth noting that facial recognition software has been used before in the 
literature (Nguyen and Noussair, 2014; Kahyaoglu and Ican, 2017). For instance, Nguyen and 
Noussair (2014) have used this technology to monitor subjects’ facial expressions as they made 
choices between a safe and a risky alternative, while Kahyaoglu and Ican (2017) have used it to 
infer the effect of positive and negative moods on individuals’ decisions in the Deal or No Deal 
TV show.  
                                               
10 It is also possible that having to sit through the long mood measurement survey puts subjects in a bad mood hence 
exacerbating the negative mood treatment while diluting the positive mood treatment. 
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Our results highlight the severity of the dilution effect and the potential of using biometric 
data when investigating the effect of emotions on individual cognition and behavior. First, we 
demonstrate this dilution effect in the mood measurement obtained from the facial expression 
analysis, where the mood for individuals in the diluted group was substantially attenuated 
immediately before they started the risk preference tasks. Furthermore, we find no significant 
change in the risk attitudes of the diluted group across treatments, contrary to the undiluted group, 
where we report a significant decrease in risk-aversion under both the positive and negative mood 
treatments. Finally, we find a significant difference in the results obtained from the two risk 
preference tasks (HL and EG), where the EG task showed no significant effect for the negative 
mood treatment and only a marginally significant effect for the positive mood treatment. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and explains the two mood measurement techniques. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model 
used to obtain point estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion under each treatment. 
Section 4 contains a discussion of the results, while section 5 highlights the main findings and 
concludes. 
4.2 Experimental Design 
 
A total of 187 undergraduate students from Texas A&M University were recruited to participate 
in this experiment, which took place at the Human Behavior Laboratory (HBL). Subjects were 
paid a $5 participation fee and had the chance to make additional earnings based on their decisions 
and the outcome of the risk preference tasks. As mentioned before, the experiment was comprised 
of three stages which were administered in a different order for subjects in the diluted and undiluted 
groups. We will start with a description of those stages, followed by a discussion of the main 
factors and treatments. 
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4.2.1 Mood Inducement Stage 
 
The subjects were split into 3 groups, which were positive (63 subjects), neutral (63 
subjects), and negative (61 subjects) mood. Each subject was presented with a three-minute 
video that was intended to manipulate their mood based on their respective group. 
Individuals in the positive affect group were presented with short clips from Mr. Bean (a 
classic British comedy starring the famous comedian Rowan Atkinson). Participants in the 
negative affect group were shown a video of animal mistreatment, while those in the neutral 
affect group watched an automobile driving down a road. A pilot experiment was 
conducted with 40 subjects to determine the most effective videos to use in this study. In 
the pilot experiment, subjects were asked to watch one of four videos (2 positive and 2 
negative), after which they filled out the PANAS survey. Facial expressions were also 
recorded during the pilot experiment and were used, along with the PANAS survey, to 
select among those videos. Overall, the videos were selected to be similar to mood 
inducement videos used in the literature. 
4.2.2 Mood Measurement Stage 
 
4.2.2.1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
As mentioned before, the success of the mood inducement stage was evaluated using two different 
mood measurement techniques. The first was the PANAS survey, which consisted of 20 questions, 
each measuring the extent to which the subject is feeling a specific mood (10 positive and 10 
negative moods). The positive moods used in this survey were happy, amused, enthusiastic, 
interested, determined, excited, inspired, strong, proud, attentive. On the other hand, the negative 
moods were sad, angry, afraid, upset, distressed, nervous, ashamed, guilty, irritable, hostile. 
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Subjects answered on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) how much they 
were feeling each of the above moods. The numbers reported for each category (positive and 
negative) are aggregated and compared to determine whether the individual is under a generally 
positive, negative, or neutral mood state. 
4.2.2.2 Facial Recognition Technology (AFFDEX) 
The second method uses the facial expression analysis software called AFFDEX (Bernin et al., 
2017; Zeng et al., 2009). This technology operates at 30Hz, meaning that it generates 30 
observations (or likelihood indexes) for each emotion per second. The software was adapted and 
configured to capture the slightest changes in facial expressions to infer the current mood the 
subject is experiencing. It is completely noninvasive and operates wirelessly through a webcam. 
AFFDEX operates on the idea of capturing emotions as expressions (Bernin et al., 2017). When 
subjects are placed in front of the computer screen where they will be presented with the stimuli, 
AFFDEX will first detect the subject’s face. This is done through a standard algorithm known as 
Viola-Jones (Viola and Jones, 2004). Following facial recognition, AFFDEX will extract what is 
known as action units (AUs) through placing facial landmarks and monitoring facial muscle 
activity (Bernin et al., 2017). Examples of AUs include raised eye brow, nose wrinkle, brow 
furrow, yaw, and lip press. Extraction of AUs is done using trained support vector machines 
(SVMs). Once the action unites are collected, AFFDEX will run an algorithm where the action 
units are compared with a massive database of faces kept in the program. Modeling of prototypic 
emotions is then performed based on the AUs using the emotional facial action coding system, 
EMFACS (Eckman et al., 2002). AFFDEX then generates a likelihood index for each mood, which 
tells how likely the subject is experiencing that specific mood based on his facial expressions. The 
emotions included in the AFFDEX software are anger, sadness, fear, disgust, contempt, joy, and 
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surprise. However, clustering methods are commonly used to discard irrelevant emotions, while 
combining relevant emotions into general positive and negative categories (Bernin et al., 2017). In 
this study, the negative mood category included anger and sadness, while the positive mood 
category included joy.11 
4.2.2.3 PANAS Versus AFFDEX 
While the PANAS survey is highly used in the literature, it constitutes an additional step (taking 
the survey) that occurs between the mood inducement and the risk task. So, although it might 
accurately capture the subject’s mood right after the mood inducement stage, we argue that the 
mood state may become diluted by the time the subject finishes the survey and is ready to start the 
subsequent economic task of interest. Also, it requires a significant cognitive effort to answer on 
a scale of 1 to 5 how much one is feeling each of 20 different mood states. The cognitive load itself 
might act to further dilute the effect of the brief mood inducement stage. Of course, the dilution 
effect may differ depending on the mood in question (i.e., positive moods might become diluted 
faster than negative moods or vice versa). Conversely, the AFFDEX mood measurement technique 
can be done simultaneously with the mood inducement since the camera will be measuring the 
subjects’ moods as they view the mood inducement video. Thus, it avoids the dilution effect 
problem that we conjecture is prominent in the PANAS method. Moreover, it can be used to 
continuously track the mood over the entire mood inducement stage rather than simply reporting 
the mood post inducement. 
 
 
                                               
11 We selected these moods for the negative and positive AFFDEX indexes since they were common between the 
AFFDEX and PANAS survey. We also tried different combinations of the AFFDEX moods and the results did not 
significantly change. 
  74 
4.2.3 Risk Preference Elicitation 
 
The subjects' risk preferences were elicited using the HL and EG risk preference elicitation tasks. 
Since all subjects completed both risk preference tasks, the order of the tasks was randomized to 
control for any ordering effects. In the HL task, subjects are presented with several choice sets as 
shown in table 13 below. There are 10 rows, each corresponding to a choice set containing two 
lottery alternatives (A and B). Although the potential outcomes from both lotteries remain the same 
in all choice sets, the probability of each outcome changes as the subject progresses through the 
task. Specifically, the probability of the higher outcome increases for both lotteries. The safer 
lottery (A) starts with a higher expected return than the riskier lottery (B) in the first few choice 
sets (rows). However, as the probability on the higher outcome increases in both lotteries, the 
expected return of lottery B eventually surpasses that of lottery A in row 5. For each choice set, 
subjects are required to indicate which lottery they prefer to play, after which their risk preferences 
are calculated based on the point at which they make the switch from the safer lottery (A) to the 
riskier one (B). Clearly, the further down the table the switch happens, the more risk-averse the 
individual is. Also, switching to lottery B before row 5 indicates risk-seeking behavior.  
The EG task is much simpler than the HL and avoids problems with inconsistent behavior 
(multiple switches between lotteries A and B). However, it provides coarse estimates of risk 
preference compare with the HL task. In this task, the subject is presented with only one choice 
set containing 6 lottery alternatives as shown in table 14. This means that the subject will only 
make one choice instead of 10. The appealing feature of this mechanism is that all the lotteries 
provide a 50/50 chance of getting a high or low payoff, which makes them easier to process and 
understand than lotteries that vary the odds of the high and low payoffs. In the EG task, the first 
lottery offers a sure payment of $5.6 (the high and low payoffs are the same), while lotteries 2-5 
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are structured to offer progressively increasing expected returns but with an increasing variance 
(risk) as well. The last lottery offers the same exact payoff as the 5th lottery but with a higher risk 
and is included to allow for detection of any risk-seekers. Based on the subject's choice, risk 
preferences are calculated through a comparison of the chosen lottery with the adjacent lotteries 
(before and after it). 
 





$8 if the die roll is 1 $15.4 if the die roll is 1
$6.4 if the die roll is 2-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 2-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-2 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-2
$6.4 if the die roll is 3-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 3-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-3 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-3
$6.4 if the die roll is 4-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 4-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-4 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-4
$6.4 if the die roll is 5-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 5-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-5 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-5
$6.4 if the die roll is 6-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 6-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-6 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-6
$6.4 if the die roll is 7-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 7-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-7 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-7
$6.4 if the die roll is 8-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 8-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-8 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-8
$6.4 if the die roll is 9-10 $0.4 if the die roll is 9-10
$8 if the die roll is 1-9 $15.4 if the die roll is 1-9
$6.4 if the die roll is 10 $0.4 if the die roll is 10










Option A Option B
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Clearly, the first factor of interest in this experiment is the mood state, which took three levels 
(positive, neutral, and negative). In order to be able to test for the dilution effect described earlier, 
we split subjects in each affect state into two groups. The first group, diluted group, performed the 
3 stages in the conventional order, which was mood inducement, followed by the PANAS survey 
then the risk elicitation tasks. The second group, undiluted group, completed the second and third 
stages in the opposite order. This group was presented with the risk task immediately following 
mood inducement and completed the PANAS survey in the last stage of the experiment. Hence, a 
second factor of interest is the task order (diluted vs. undiluted), which means that we can think of 
this experimental design as a 3X2 design. A summary of the treatments is included in table 15. 
 
Table 15. Summary of Treatments 
 
Gamble (50/50 Lottery) Low Payoff High Payoff
Gamble 1 $5.6 $5.6
Gamble 2 $4.8 $7.2
Gamble 3 $4.0 $8.8
Gamble 4 $3.2 $10.4
Gamble 5 $2.4 $12.0
Gamble 6 $0.4 $14.0
Neutral Positive Negative
Diluted Group n = 32 n = 33 n = 31




  77 
4.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Structural Model 
 
In order to obtain structural estimates for the coefficient of relative risk aversion by treatment, we 
adapt the methodology used in Dave et al. (2010). We assume a constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility function, which takes the following form: 
 
(()|+) = )-./1 + + (30) 
 
where ) is the amount of money and + denotes the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. For each 
binary choice the subjects face in the HL and EG tasks, they assess the expected utility of each 
alternative 2: 
  3(4 =5[7' × (()'|+)]' , ∀< = 1,2 (31) 
 
where 7'  is the probability associated with payoff )'. 
 If we denote by 3(> and 3(?  the utility of the lotteries on the left-hand and right-hand 
sides respectively, then we can construct a simple probabilistic choice rule as follows: 
 
@+(A&BCDE	G) = 3(>3(> + 3(?  (32) 
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Equation 3 forms the basis for the logistic conditional logarithmic likelihood function D(+|H4) 
which can be maximized with respect to + based on the subjects’ decisions (H4) in the HL and EG 
risk tasks. The parameter + can be specified as a function of treatments and individual 
characteristics + = I(JK) to test for treatment effects and individual heterogeneity. The resulting 
modified likelihood function can be expressed as D(+, K|H4, J4). 
4.3.2 Coding the Choice Data 
 
The choices subjects made between the lotteries for each choice task in the HL and EG elicitation 
methods were represented as a binary choice variable H4 for use in the structural model described 
above. Coding this variable for the HL task was straightforward. The variable H4 took the value 1 
if the subject chose the risky lottery A and 0 otherwise. Since each subject made 10 choices in the 
HL task, each had 10 observations of H4 in this task. In order to code the decisions in the EG task 
in a comparable manner, we coded the data following Dave et al. (2010). Although subjects made 
only one choice between 6 alternatives in this task, we created 5 binary choice sets as follows: 
Decision 1: Gamble 5 vs. Gamble 6 
Decision 2: Gamble 4 vs. Gamble 5 
Decision 3: Gamble 3 vs. Gamble 4 
Decision 4: Gamble 2 vs. Gamble 3 
Decision 5: Gamble 1 vs. Gamble 2 
 
To understand how subjects’ decisions are translated into the coded variable, suppose a 
subject chooses gamble 2 in the EG task. Obviously, this means the subject prefers gamble 2 to 
gamble 3 and gamble 1. But, it also implies that he prefers gamble 3 to 4, gamble 4 to 5, and 
gamble 5 to 6. Hence, the vector H4 is coded as [0, 0, 0, 0, 1] in this case. Similar logic can be 
applied to determine the binary choices associated with the other possible decisions in the EG task.  
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Figure 7. Individual Utility Maximizing Lottery Choice 
 
The validity of this coding method has already been asserted by Dave et al. (2010), 
however, we will repeat the illustration here to further establish the reasonability of this logic. As 
we know, the expected value and standard deviation of the gambles in the EG task increase linearly 
except for gamble 6, which has the same expected value as gamble 5 and a higher standard 
deviation. So, if we plot the gambles on a graph with expected return on the vertical axis and 
standard deviation on the horizontal axis, they would follow an upward sloping line up until 
gamble 5, after which the line becomes flat for gamble 6, as in figure 7. Risk-averse indifference 
curves will be concave and upward sloping with a tangency at the most preferred gamble. If the 
subject picks gamble 3 for example, and assuming the indifference curves are well-behaved, this 
implies that gamble 2 is preferred to gamble 1, gamble 3 preferred to gamble 2 and gamble 4, 
gamble 4 preferred to 5, and 5 to 6. While this method imposes the assumption that individuals 
viewed the alternatives in the order presented above, a separate model was estimated on the EG 
data where this assumption was relaxed and the estimation was conditioned on the 6 lottery 
Gamble 
IC 
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alternatives. The results were generally similar across those two models and indicated significant 
risk-aversion in the EG task.12 
4.3.3 Hypotheses Regarding the Treatment Effects 
 
This section formally states the different hypotheses regarding the effect of positive and negative 
moods on risk preferences implied by past research. We also propose new hypotheses taking the 
dilution effect into consideration and the previous finding that there are significant differences in 
the preference estimates obtained from the HL and EG tasks. In this framework we will suppose 
that the subject’s mood is M ∈ ℝ, where it increases and decreases for positive and negative mood 
respectively. +4 is the relative risk aversion coefficient obtained from elicitation method 2, which 
increases (decreases) as the subject becomes more risk-averse (risk-seeking). Also, we denote by P the time span between mood inducement and risk elicitation such that P = 0 if risk elicitation 
happens immediately following mood inducement.  
Hypothesis 1 (Mood Maintenance Hypothesis) 
There is a directly proportional relationship between M and +, with  Q+/QM > 0		. 
This hypothesis is in line with research supporting the mood maintenance hypothesis, 
where subjects exhibit higher levels of risk aversion when experiencing a positive mood and vice 
versa. Under this view, the individual is assumed to care about positive mood conservation. The 
desire to preserve or maintain the pleasant feeling will lead the individual to refrain from engaging 
in any behavior that might jeopardize his current mood state. Hence, the subject will shy away 
from risk and will exhibit higher risk-aversion levels. On the other hand, when experiencing a 
                                               
12 The results are available upon request. 
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negative mood, the individual will want to offset this unpleasant feeling and so will engage in risky 
behavior that might generate high winnings. 
Hypothesis 2 (Affect Infusion Model) 
There is a negatively proportional relationship between M and +, with  Q+/QM < 0		. 
This hypothesis is supportive of the affect infusion model, where subjects exhibit higher 
risk-seeking behavior when experiencing a positive mood and vice versa. The argument is based 
on the idea that individuals change the way they weigh positive and negative outcomes depending 
on their mood. When experiencing a positive mood, individuals would be more optimistic and will 
overvalue higher positive outcomes. Hence, they tend to choose the riskier alternative since it 
carries the higher positive outcome. On the other hand, individuals will adopt a more pessimistic 
outlook under a negative mood and will fixate more on the negative outcome. This will drive them 
to shy away from the riskier alternative since it carries the higher negative outcome. 
Hypothesis 3 (Unified model) 
The relationship between M and + depends on the sign on M, where is could be Q+/QM > 0 if M >0 and Q+/QM < 0 for M < 0 or vice versa. 
This hypothesis supports the idea that both the MMH and AIM might be valid, but for 
different affect valences. For instance, it could be the case that individuals exhibit a higher or lower 
level of risk-aversion under both the positive and negative mood. Individuals might fixate on 
higher outcomes when experiencing a positive mood, while desiring to offset their unpleasant 
feeling by taking more risk when experiencing a negative mood. On the other hand, they might 
avoid risk to maintain their positive mood, but fixate on negative outcomes and also avoid risk 
under a negative mood. 
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Hypothesis 4 (Dilution Effect) 
The relationship between M and + is a decreasing function of P. Hence, denoting K = Q+/QM we 
can write 	QK/QP < 0. 
This hypothesis is congruent with the dilution effect described earlier. Under this 
hypothesis, the longer the time span between mood inducement and risk elicitation the more 
diluted the subject becomes when reporting the risk preferences, which in turn attenuates the 
treatment effects towards zero. 
Hypothesis 5 (Task Dependent Effects) 
The relationship between M and + depends on 2, such that Q+4/QM ≠ Q+V/QM for 2 ≠ W. 
This hypothesis states that the effect of mood on risk preferences depends on the specific 
risk preference elicitation method used. This view is supported in the literature as it was previously 
shown that the coefficient of relative risk aversion differs significantly based on the method (Dave 
et al. 2010).  
4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
4.4.1 Analysis of Mood Inducement 
 
We start by assessing the effectiveness of the mood inducement stage. The average likelihood 
indexes obtained from the AFFDEX facial expression analysis were aggregated for the positive 
and negative facial expressions and they are reported in table 16. Table 17 presents the results from 
the PANAS survey. As we can see in table 16, the negative AFFDEX likelihood index was highly 
significant only for subjects in the negative mood treatment, while the positive AFFDEX 
likelihood index was highly significant only for subjects in the positive mood treatment. As for the 
neutral mood treatment, as expected, they did not display highly significant positive nor negative 
expressions. This implies that the videos were successful in inducing the subjects with the desired 
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mood. In fact, results from the PANAS survey generally conform with the AFFDEX measures. 
Although the PANAS index was positive for subjects in the negative mood treatment, it was 
significantly higher for the positive mood treatment. As for subjects in negative mood treatment, 
it is clear that the PANAS index was significantly lower than the positive and neutral mood 
treatments. Taking both measurements into consideration, it might be the case that the AFFDEX 
measurement is better suited for detecting positive as opposed to negative affect. This argument is 
based on the fact that the positive AFFDEX likelihood index was very high in magnitude and 
significance for the positive moods treatment while the negative AFFDEX likelihood index was 
only high in significance for the negative mood treatment.  
 
 Result 1. Mood inducement was successful as measured by the PANAS survey and 
the AFFDEX facial expression analysis. However, the AFFDEX technology seems more 
accurate in detecting positive affect.  
 





Neutral (n=63) 0.362 0.073 *
(0.264) (0.040)
Positive (n=63) 1.069 * 17.571 ***
(0.634) (3.156)
Negative (n=61) 0.445 *** 0.635
(0.154) (0.450)
Negative Positive
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
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Table 17. Summary of PANAS Measure by Treatment and Dilution State 
 
 
Next, we investigate the difference in the mood measurement between the diluted and 
undiluted groups to discover if there was any dilution in the mood of the former before performing 
the risk preference tasks. The PANAS measurement in table 17 was further broken down by 
dilution group. Here, “PANAS Undiluted” stands for the group that reported their mood in the 
survey right after the video, while “PANAS Diluted” stands for the group that had to complete the 
risk preference tasks before reporting their moods in the survey. It is extremely important to note 
that while the group that performed the survey before the risk preference tasks is defined as the 
diluted group with respect to their decisions in the risk elicitation, this definition has to be reversed 
when considering the subjects’ responses in the PANAS survey. Here, the group that reported their 
mood in the survey right after the video (PANAS Undiluted) was not diluted at the time they were 
taking this survey, while the other group (PANAS Diluted) was diluted at the time they took the 
survey because they had to sit through the risk task first. As we can see from table 17, the PANAS 
survey results indicate mood dilution only for the negative mood group.  
In order to further analyze the mood dilution, we track the negative and positive AFFDEX 
indices for the negative and positive mood treatments, respectively, at the time participants 
watched the video and right before they started the risk preference elicitation tasks. The results are 
Neutral (n=60) Positive (61) Negative (=60)
Overall 15.217 *** 17.951 *** -1.617
(0.843) (1.119) (1.534)
PANAS Undiluted 17.031 *** 16.424 *** -6.097 ***
(1.146) (1.627) (2.005)




Across Dilution Condition P=0.179 P=0.140 P=0.002
- P=0.035 P=0.000
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reported in table 18 and they clearly show a drastic decrease in the positive affect for the diluted 
group in the positive mood treatment. However, we can also see that the AFFDEX measure reports 
a decrease in the negative affect for both the diluted and undiluted groups in the negative mood 
treatment. We conclude that there is suggestive evidence of mood dilution for both positive and 
negative mood treatments.  
 
 Result 2. We find suggestive evidence of mood dilution among the diluted group in both 
positive and negative mood treatments. 
 
Table 18. Summary of AFFDEX Measures with Dilution 
 
 
4.4.2 Analysis of Decisions in the Holt-Laury Risk Elicitation Task 
 
Table 19 provides a breakdown for the number of safe choices in the HL task made by subjects in 
each mood treatment along with the range of relative risk aversion coefficients associated with 
each choice. The data is reported both for the overall sample of participants as well as the 
subsample of consistent subjects. Consistent subjects are the individuals who did not make 
multiple switches in the task or choose the safe lottery in the last choice set (when there was 
certainty of receiving the high payoff). A total of 26 out of 187 subjects displayed inconsistent 
behavior in the HL task. Two subjects had missing observations and were excluded from the 
Positive AFFDEX for Positive Mood Group
Undiluted 21.472 *** 21.586 ***
(5.060) (7.246)
Diluted 14.243 *** 0.046
(3.926) (0.044)
Negative AFFDEX for Negative Mood Group
Undiluted 1.046 ** 4.690
(0.565) (3.644)
Diluted 0.882 *** 1.324
(0.301) (1.135)
During Video Right Before Risk Tasks
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
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analysis. The histograms associated with table 19 are presented in figures 8a and 8b for the overall 
sample and the consistent subsample respectively. First, we notice that the results for the overall 
sample were almost identical to the subsample of consistent subjects. Also, we can see that the 
results in table 19, which aggregate the diluted and undiluted groups, do not signal a significant 
difference in the HL decisions across treatments. The breakdown looks very similar for the neutral, 
positive, and negative treatments. 
 
Table 19. Summary of Choices in Holt-Laury Risk Task 
 
 
Safe Choices Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=62) Positive (n=63) Negative (n=60) Neutral (n=52) Positive (n=55) Negative (n=50)
0 r < -1.71 3.23 6.35 1.67 3.85 7.27 2.00
1 -1.71 < r < -0.95 1.61 1.59 0.00 0.00 1.82 0.00
2 -0.95 < r < -0.49 4.84 4.76 3.33 5.77 5.45 4.00
3 -0.49 < r < -0.14 8.06 17.46 13.33 9.62 16.36 14.00
4 -0.14 < r < 0.15 19.35 19.05 20.00 15.38 16.36 18.00
5 0.15 < r < 0.41 9.68 11.11 8.33 3.85 7.27 10.00
6 0.41 < r < 0.68 17.74 14.29 23.33 19.23 16.36 18.00
7 0.68 < r < 0.97 19.35 4.76 15.00 23.08 5.45 18.00
8 0.97 < r < 1.37 11.29 14.29 10.00 13.46 16.36 12.00
9-10 1.37 < r 4.84 6.35 5.00 5.77 7.27 4.00
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 Next, we examine the treatment effects separately for the diluted and undiluted groups. We 
only consider the subsample of consistent subjects here. An analysis using the overall sample of 
participants yielded very similar results and is available in the appendix. The results in table 19 
were further broken down by dilution group and reported in table 20. The associated histograms 
for the diluted and undiluted groups are shown in figures 9a and 9b respectively. While the 
breakdown is still very similar across treatments for the diluted group, we do observe a higher 
concentration around lower numbers of safe choices in the undiluted positive and negative 
treatments compared to the control. Although this result cannot stand on its own, it can be taken 
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Safe Choices Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=26) Positive (n=24) Negative (n=22) Neutral (n=26) Positive (n=31) Negative (n=28)
0 r < -1.71 0.00 0.00 4.55 7.69 12.90 0.00
1 -1.71 < r < -0.95 0.00 4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 -0.95 < r < -0.49 3.85 12.50 4.55 7.69 0.00 3.57
3 -0.49 < r < -0.14 3.85 12.50 9.09 15.38 19.35 17.86
4 -0.14 < r < 0.15 11.54 20.83 18.18 19.23 12.90 17.86
5 0.15 < r < 0.41 3.85 8.33 9.09 3.85 6.45 10.71
6 0.41 < r < 0.68 26.92 20.83 18.18 11.54 12.90 17.86
7 0.68 < r < 0.97 26.92 8.33 27.27 19.23 3.23 10.71
8 0.97 < r < 1.37 11.54 4.17 9.09 15.38 25.81 14.29
9-10 1.37 < r 11.54 8.33 0.00 0.00 6.45 7.14
Fraction of Choices (n) Dilution Fraction of Choices (n) No Dilution
a.
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Figure 9. Histogram of Choices in HL Task. (a) diluted group. (b) undiluted group 
 
To further test for the differential treatment effect across the diluted and undiluted groups, 
the average number of safe choices was calculated and reported in table 21. Here the picture 
becomes much clearer. As we can see, the average number of safe choices made by the positive 
and negative treatments is not significantly different from the control (neutral mood) for the diluted 
group. On the other hand, for the undiluted group, it was significantly lower at the 95% confidence 
level for the positive mood treatment and 90% confidence level for the negative mood treatment. 
It seems that among the undiluted group, individuals in the positive and negative mood treatments 
were more risk-seeking compared to the control, however, this result is not as strong for the 
negative mood treatment since the difference was only marginally significant for them. If one were 
to simply rely on the PANAS survey in the conventional three-stage experiment the conclusion 
would be no significant effect of mood on risk behavior. However, incorporating facial expression 
b.
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analysis technology allows for a more accurate assessment of the true effect of positive and 
negative moods on risk preferences. This leads us to our third result. 
 
Result 3. We find clear evidence of the dilution effect that we conjectured was inherent in 
the conventional three-stage design. The undiluted group displayed significantly higher risk-
seeking behavior in the positive and negative mood treatments compared to the control. While the 
AIM clearly dominates in the positive mood domain, the evidence weakly favors the MMH in the 
negative mood domain. 
 
 






Overall 5.577 4.964 5.380
(0.311) (0.345) (0.288)
Dilution 4.846 5.065 5.464
(0.476) (0.508) (0.387)
No Dilution 6.308 4.833 5.273
(0.354) (0.453) (0.442)
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4.4.3 Analysis of Decisions in the Eckel-Grossman Risk Elicitation Task 
 
We now turn to examine the choices across treatments in the EG risk task, a breakdown of which 
is presented in table 22 and figure 10. As in the case with the HL task, we notice a very similar 
breakdown of choices across treatments when aggregating the diluted and undiluted groups. Again, 
in the absence of facial expression analysis to overcome the dilution effect, one would be led to 
report no impact for neither positive nor negative moods on risk preferences. Once the results are 
considered separately for the diluted and undiluted groups, however, they cast doubt on this 
conclusion. Table 23 and figure 11 report the results for the diluted group, while table 24 and figure 
12 report the results for the undiluted group. The choices appear very similar across treatments for 
the diluted group, but we can observe a clustering around the higher risk choices in the undiluted 
positive treatment group. 
 
 
Figure 10. Histogram of Choices in Eckel-Grossman Task 
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Figure 11. Histogram of Choices in Eckel-Grossman Task for Diluted Group 
 
 
Table 23. Summary of Choices in Eckel-Grossman Risk Task for Diluted Group 
 
Gamble (50/50) Expected Return Std. Dev. Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=63) Positive (n=63) Negative (n=61)
1 5.6 0 3.46 < r 20.63 9.52 19.67
2 6 1.2 1.16 < r < 3.46 14.29 11.11 16.39
3 6.4 2.4 0.71 < r < 1.16 25.40 31.75 32.79
4 6.8 3.8 0.5 < r < 0.71 12.70 19.05 13.11
5 7.2 4.8 0 < r < 0.5 11.11 9.52 9.84
6 7.2 6.8 r < 0 15.87 19.05 8.20
Fraction of Choices (%)
Gamble (50/50) Expected Return Std. Dev. Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=32) Positive (n=33) Negative (n=31)
1 5.6 0 3.46 < r 12.5 6.06 12.90
2 6 1.2 1.16 < r < 3.46 18.75 12.12 9.68
3 6.4 2.4 0.71 < r < 1.16 15.62 36.36 35.48
4 6.8 3.8 0.5 < r < 0.71 18.75 18.18 16.13
5 7.2 4.8 0 < r < 0.5 15.62 12.12 16.13
6 7.2 6.8 r < 0 18.75 15.15 9.68
Fraction of Choices (%) - Dilution
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Figure 12. Histogram of Choices in Eckel-Grossman Task for Undiluted Group 
 
 
Table 24. Summary of Choices in Eckel-Grossman Risk Task for Undiluted Group 
 
 
 Table 25 provides the average choice in the EG task made by each treatment and dilution 
group. Once again, we can see a sign of the dilution effect, but to a much lesser extent compared 
with the HL task. As expected, the choices were not significantly different across treatments for 
the diluted group. As for the undiluted group, the negative mood treatment is still not statistically 
different from the control, while the positive mood treatment is more risk-seeking with only 
Gamble (50/50) Expected Return Std. Dev. Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=31) Positive (n=30) Negative (n=30)
1 5.6 0 3.46 < r 29.03 13.33 26.67
2 6 1.2 1.16 < r < 3.46 9.68 10.00 23.33
3 6.4 2.4 0.71 < r < 1.16 35.48 26.67 30.00
4 6.8 3.8 0.5 < r < 0.71 6.45 20.00 10.00
5 7.2 4.8 0 < r < 0.5 6.45 6.67 3.33
6 7.2 6.8 r < 0 12.90 23.33 6.67
Fraction of Choices (%) - No Dilution
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marginal significance. Interestingly, although results from the HL task indicated more risk-seeking 
behavior for both negative and positive mood treatments compared to the control, the EG task 
conforms to this result only for the positive mood treatment. This means that the choice of risk 
preference elicitation method is important when considering the effect of mood on risk-taking 
behavior. The difference in the results between the HL and EG task might be due to the simplicity 
of the latter, or to the fact that the former task generates more refined ranges for the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (Dave et al., 2010). More research is needed to investigate the factors that 
can possibly lead to divergent results across risk tasks in this domain. We now state our fourth 
result. 
 
 Result 4. The dilution effect is still apparent in the EG task. While individuals in the 
positive mood treatment still display more risk-seeking behavior compared to the control, the 
results for the negative mood treatment are more task-dependent. 
 
Table 25. Average Choice in EG Task by Treatment and Dilution Group 
 
Overall 3.270 3.651 3.016
(0.216) (0.195) (0.192)
Dilution 3.625 3.636 3.419
(0.300) (0.249) (0.265)
No Dilution 2.903 3.667 2.600
(0.302) (0.308) (0.261)
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4.4.4 Structural Estimation of the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 
 
Although the analysis presented so far was informative, it is not sufficient to fully address changes 
in risk-taking behavior. The main reason is that the choices in the HL and EG tasks, considered in 
a descriptive analysis, only reveal ranges for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In order to 
provide a more accurate analysis of the treatment effects and the dilution effect presented earlier, 
we now turn to estimating the model described in the methodology section. Using this model, we 
can not only provide point estimates for the relative risk aversion coefficient, but can model it as 
a function of treatments, risk tasks, dilution groups, and individual characteristics. This will enable 
us to make a more definitive conclusion regarding the true effect of positive and negative moods 
on risk preferences as well as the significance of the dilution effect inherent in the conventionally 
adopted three-stage experimental design.  
Table 26 reports the results from the structural estimation with different specifications of 
the relative risk aversion coefficient. In column 1, the regressors were an indicator variable for the 
HL task, indicator variables for the positive and negative treatments, and the interaction between 
the treatments and the dilution groups. Column 2 included demographic variables pertaining to 
gender, race, and school year, while column 3 included income. Finally, column 4 was a saturated 
model that combined all the regressors in the first three specifications. 
As can be seen, the coefficient on the indicator variable for the HL task was negative and 
significant across all specification, proving that the choice of risk preference elicitation method 
can indeed alter the results. The negative sign on this coefficient indicates that subjects were more 
risk-seeking in the HL compared to the EG task. Moreover, while the coefficient on the positive 
mood treatment was negative and significant across all specifications, the coefficient on the 
negative mood treatment was consistently not significant. As for the dilution effect, it was also 
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only significant for the positive mood treatment. The fact that the magnitude of the coefficient for 
the dilution effect is substantial compared with the coefficient on the positive mood treatment 
provides further evidence that solely relying on the PANAS survey in the conventional three-stage 
design leads to a significant bias in the results.  
 
Table 26. Structural Model Estimation of the CRRA Coefficient 
 
 
   
Variable (r) 
Constant 1.605 *** 1.738 *** 1.829 *** 1.852 ***
(0.077) (0.132) (0.093) (0.138)
Holt-Laury -1.477 *** -1.515 *** -1.482 *** -1.517 ***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
Positive Diluted -0.320 *** -0.317 *** -0.339 *** -0.326 ***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.103)
Negative Diluted -0.041 -0.048 -0.101 -0.072
(0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100)
Positive Non-Diluted -0.265 *** -0.253 ** -0.277 *** -0.257 **
(0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100)
Negative Non-Diluted -0.012 -0.021 -0.068 -0.044
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097)
Male -0.240 *** -0.232 ***
(0.072) (0.071)
School Year -0.072 ** -0.056 *
(0.030) (0.031)
White 0.132 0.193 **
(0.093) (0.098)
African American 0.376 *** 0.351 ***
(0.115) (0.117)
Hispanic 0.224 ** 0.192 *
(0.101) (0.102)
Medium Income -0.306 *** -0.225 **
(0.090) (0.092)





[1] [2] [3] [4]
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
- -
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
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Regarding the demographic and socioeconomic effects, we find males to be more risk-
seeking than females and upper school year students more risk-seeking compared with lower 
school year students. This is apparent in the fact that the coefficients on the associated indicator 
variables were negative and significant. Also, the coefficients on the indicator variables for White, 
African American, and Hispanic individuals were positive and significant implying that they are 
generally more risk-averse. Finally, we report a negative relationship between income-level and 
risk-aversion since medium- and high-income individuals were found more risk-seeking compared 
to low-income individuals. It is worth noting that the literature carries divergent results regarding 
the demographics of risk aversion (Hartog et al., 2002; Dave et al. 2010; Harrison and Rutstrom, 
2008; Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001). 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
There is a vast literature on the effect of mood on individual risk preferences with two main 
hypotheses. While the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH) predicts increased risk-aversion with 
positive mood and vice versa, the affect infusion model (AIM) carries an opposite view. In this 
chapter, we utilize facial expression analysis technology in order to provide a more accurate 
investigation of the effect of induced mood on risk preferences. Moreover, we test for a dilution 
effect which we conjecture is present in the three-stage experimental design that is commonly 
adopted when tackling this question. We apply two popular risk preference elicitation tasks 
constructed by Holt-Laury (HL) and Eckel-Grossman (EG) in order to examine potential 
differences in treatment effects across tasks. 
 We find strong evidence that positive mood stimulates more risk-seeking behavior. This 
result was consistent across risk preference elicitation methods, although it was more pronounced 
in the HL task. Furthermore, this result only became apparent when considering the undiluted 
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group of individuals, who did not follow the conventional three-stage design and were not diluted 
prior to reporting their risk preferences. As for the effect of negative mood, it was more task-
dependent. While undiluted individuals displayed slightly more risk-seeking behavior in the HL 
task, no effect was found in the EG task. We conclude that the results are more supportive of the 
AIM, with weak evidence favoring the MMH in the negative mood domain. Furthermore, we argue 
that the divergent results found in the literature might arise from the issues inherent in the 
conventional mood measurement methods and differences in the risk preference tasks used to 
measure risk preferences. 
 Our analysis revealed a very important issue that needs to be considered when testing the 
effect of mood on individual behavior in general. Solely relying on the more primitive self-reported 
mood measurement techniques can lead to dilution of the subjects’ moods before performing the 
task of interest, which in turn causes a significant bias in the treatment effects. We show that 
biometric equipment is useful in this regard as it can circumvent this problem and provide accurate 
measures of the subjects’ moods without the need for an intermediate task between mood 
inducement and preference elicitation. Our design can prove very useful for producers and other 
companies as it provides a stronger understanding of the relationship between mood and individual 
behavior. For example, some companies seek to induce customers with a certain mood state in 
order to stimulate higher levels of purchasing. Advertisements also commonly aim at changing 
subjects’ moods and feelings towards certain products to increase market shares. Moreover, large 
supermarket chains like Walmart have started using facial recognition technology to monitor the 
subject’s mood during the shopping experience. This can generate valuable data that will help 
them target specific issues leading to consumer satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Multimedia and 
entertainment conglomerates like Disney and Universal Studios are also using facial expression 
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analysis technology to test the effectiveness of certain movie scenes on the viewer’s mood. In 
conclusion, we hope this work encourages further research on the topic that can provide an even 
deeper understanding of the mechanism through which emotions operate to influence the 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is aimed at investigating some of the social and psychological determinants of 
cooperative and risk-taking behavior. Laboratory experiments and econometric models were used 
to investigate individual contributions to public goods, individual giving behavior in dictator 
games, and individual decisions under uncertainty. 
 Chapter I studied the interaction between high- and low-income individuals in voluntary 
contributions mechanisms. By varying the endowment level and marginal-per-capita-return 
between subjects within the same group, this chapter also addressed changes in behavior resulting 
from differences in the perceived relative return from the public good. Using a finite mixture 
model, it was found that low-income individuals behave as either opportunists or free-riders. On 
the other hand, high-income individuals were classified as either selfists or free-riders. While 
opportunists tried to benefit from the presence of the high-income type by stimulating higher 
contributions to the public good through cooperation, selfists were less prone to cooperation in the 
presence of the low-income type and their contribution levels were lower when playing with low-
income individuals in the same group. Moreover, free-riders were far more common among the 
low-income type, which in some way highlights the main driver for the selfist tendency among 
high-income individuals. This work is useful in guiding policy makers through the implementation 
of more efficient interventions regarding the provision of public goods in neighborhoods with 
varying income levels. Moreover, it is important for producers considering investing in generic 
advertising to help increase the total demand for their commodity. Through a better understanding 
of the interaction between high- and low-income individuals in this setting, small and large 
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producers can form better predictions regarding the potential benefits to be gained from generic 
advertisements. 
 Chapter II refined one of the most widely accepted structural models explaining individual 
giving in dictator games. The model rests on the premise that social norms drive much of the 
behavior in this setting. This chapter addressed the important question of whether social norms are 
perceived by individuals as a first impulse or last resort when making their transfer decisions. By 
incorporating an additional parameter into the model, and an experimental design that allowed the 
structural estimation of this parameter, it was found that individuals opt for a self-centered 
approach so long that they can justify it. In other words, individuals strictly adhere to social norms 
only when the environment does not allow for an alternative interpretation that can be used to 
break those norms. However, self-interest become more prominent when individuals can vindicate 
profit-maximizing behavior. This work is valuable for charities and other fund-raising 
organizations as it will provide them with recommendations on how to enhance their performance 
and generate more donations. Furthermore, it will serve to guide researchers into making better 
predictions of individual giving behavior by assessing the underlying social norm structure of the 
setting. 
 Chapter III utilized facial expression analysis technology to shed more light on the effect 
of positive and negative moods on risk preferences. In doing so, it uncovered a dilution effect issue 
that is prevalent in the conventional three-stage design that is commonly used for investigating the 
effect of mood on individual behavior. In this sense, this chapter highlighted the potential benefit 
and usefulness of biometric data in experimental and behavioral economics. While the literature 
carried divergent results regarding the effect of positive and negative mood on risk preference, this 
chapter was able to demonstrate valence-dependent effect of mood on risk preferences. In other 
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words, the evidence supported the affect infusion model (AIM) in the positive mood domain and 
the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH) in the negative mood domain. Finally, it was also found 
that the treatment effect, especially the negative mood treatment, depends on the risk preference 
elicitation method used. This work is useful for producers and other companies as it will help them 
better understand the forces driving individual demand for their commodities. In fact, facial 
expression analysis technology is already being used by large corporations like Walmart, Disney, 










  103 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt. “A theoretical analysis of altruism 
and decision error in public goods games.” Journal of Public Economics 70, no. 2 (1998): 297-
323. 
Andreoni, James. “Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?” The 
American Economic Review (1995): 891-904. 
 
Andreoni, James. “Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian 
equivalence.” The Journal of Political Economy (1989): 1447-1458. 
 
Andreoni, James. “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow 
giving.” The economic journal 100, no. 401 (1990): 464-477. 
 
Andreoni, James. “Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effects of positive and negative framing 
on cooperation in experiments.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1995): 1-21. 
 
Andreoni, James, and B. Douglas Bernheim. “Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and 
experimental analysis of audience effects.” Econometrica 77, no. 5 (2009): 1607-1636. 
 
Andreoni, James, and John Miller. “Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the 
consistency of preferences for altruism.” Econometrica 70, no. 2 (2002): 737-753. 
 
Arkes, Hal R., Lisa Tandy Herren, and Alice M. Isen. “The role of potential loss in the influence 
of affect on risk-taking behavior.” Organizational behavior and human decision processes 42, 
no. 2 (1988): 181-193. 
 
Ashley, Richard, Sheryl Ball, and Catherine Eckel. “Motives for giving: A reanalysis of two classic 
public goods experiments.” Southern Economic Journal 77, no. 1 (2010): 15-26. 
 
Bardsley, Nicholas. “Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?” Experimental Economics 11, no. 
2 (2008): 122-133. 
 
Bardsley, Nicholas. “Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods.” 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 71, no. 2 (2000): 191-228. 
 
Bardsley, Nicholas, and Peter G. Moffatt. “The experimetrics of public goods: Inferring 
motivations from contributions.” Theory and Decision 62, no. 2 (2007): 161-193. 
 
Becker, Gary. “A theory of social interactions.” Journal of Political Economy (1974): 82 (6), 1063 
– 1093. 
 
Bekker, Marrie HJ, Carola van de Meerendonk, and Jessica Mollerus. “Effects of negative mood 
induction and impulsivity on self-perceived emotional eating.” International Journal of Eating 
Disorders 36, no. 4 (2004): 461-469. 
 
  104 
Bergstrom, Theodore, Lawrence Blume, and Hal Varian. “On the private provision of public 
goods.” Journal of public economics 29, no. 1 (1986): 25-49. 
 
Bernin, Arne, Larissa Müller, Sobin Ghose, Kai von Luck, Christos Grecos, Qi Wang, and Florian 
Vogt. “Towards more robust automatic facial expression recognition in smart environments.” 
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to 
Assistive Environments, pp. 37-44. ACM, 2017. 
 
Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick. “Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus 
acts of kindness.” International journal of game theory 27, no. 2 (1998): 269-299. 
 
Brester, Gary W., and Ted C. Schroeder. “The impacts of brand and generic advertising on meat 
demand.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, no. 4 (1995): 969-979. 
 
Brief, Arthur P., Ann Houston Butcher, and Loriann Roberson. “Cookies, disposition, and job 
attitudes: The effects of positive mood-inducing events and negative affectivity on job 
satisfaction in a field experiment.” Organizational behavior and human decision processes 62, 
no. 1 (1995): 55-62. 
 
Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels. “ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition.” American economic review (2000): 166-193. 
 
Broberg, Tomas, Tore Ellingsen, and Magnus Johannesson. “Is generosity involuntary?” 
Economics Letters 94, no. 1 (2007): 32-37. 
 
Buckley, Edward, and Rachel Croson. “Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary 
provision of linear public goods.” Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 4 (2006): 935-955. 
 
Cappelen, A. W., U. H. Nielsen, E. O. Sorensen, B. Tungodden, and J.-R. Tyran (2013). “Give 
and take in dictator games.” Economics Letters 118 (2), 280-283. 
 
Capra, Mónica C. “Mood-driven behavior in strategic interactions.” American Economic Review 
94, no. 2 (2004): 367-372. 
 
Capra, C. Monica, Kelli F. Lanier, and Shireen Meer. “The effects of induced mood on bidding in 
random nth-price auctions.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75, no. 2 (2010): 
223-234. 
 
Cardenas, Juan Camilo, John Stranlund, and Cleve Willis. “Economic inequality and burden-
sharing in the provision of local environmental quality.” Ecological economics 40, no. 3 
(2002): 379-395. 
 
Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Rob Moir, and R. Andrew Muller. “The voluntary provision 
of public goods under varying income distributions.” Canadian Journal of Economics (1996): 
54-69. 
 
  105 
Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Robert Moir, and R. Andrew Muller. “Heterogeneity and the 
voluntary provision of public goods.” Experimental Economics 2, no. 1 (1999): 5-30. 
 
Cherry, Todd L., Peter Frykblom, and Jason F. Shogren. “Hardnose the dictator.” American 
Economic Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 1218-1221. 
 
Crespi, John M. “The generic advertising controversy: how did we get here and where are we 
going?” Review of Agricultural Economics 25, no. 2 (2003): 294-315. 
 
Crespi, John M., and Roger A. McEowen. “The constitutionality of generic advertising checkoff 
programs.” Choices 21, no. 2 (2006): 61-65. 
 
Croson, Rachel TA. “Theories of commitment, altruism and reciprocity: Evidence from linear 
public goods games.” Economic Inquiry 45, no. 2 (2007): 199-216. 
 
Cryder, Cynthia E., Jennifer S. Lerner, James J. Gross, and Ronald E. Dahl. “Misery is not miserly: 
Sad and self-focused individuals spend more.” Psychological science 19, no. 6 (2008): 525-
530. 
 
Dana, Jason, Daylian M. Cain, and Robyn M. Dawes. “What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly 
(but quiet) exit in dictator games.” Organizational Behavior and human decision Processes 
100, no. 2 (2006): 193-201. 
 
Dave, Chetan, Catherine C. Eckel, Cathleen A. Johnson, and Christian Rojas. “Eliciting risk 
preferences: When is simple better?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 41, no. 3 (2010): 219-
243. 
 
Dreber, Anna, Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, and David G. Rand. “Do people care about 
social context? Framing effects in dictator games.” Experimental Economics 16, no. 3 (2013): 
349-371. 
 
Drichoutis, Andreas C., and Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr. “Eliciting risk and time preferences under 
induced mood states.” The Journal of Socio-Economics 45 (2013): 18-27. 
 
Eckel, Catherine C., Philip J. Grossman, and Rachel M. Johnston. “An experimental test of the 
crowding out hypothesis.” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 8 (2005): 1543-1560. 
 
Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. “Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in 
attitudes toward financial risk.” Evolution and human behavior 23, no. 4 (2002): 281-295. 
 
Ekman, P., W. V. Friesen, and J. Hager. “Emotional Facial Action Coding System. Manual and 
Investigators Guide.” (2002). 
 
Eichenberger, Reiner, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. “Rational moralists: The role of fairness in 
democratic economic politics.” Public Choice 94, no. 1-2 (1998): 191-210. 
 
  106 
Ellingsen, Tore, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, and Sara Munkhammar. “Social 
framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?” Games and Economic Behavior 76, no. 1 (2012): 117-
130. 
 
Engel, Christoph. “Dictator games: A meta study.” Experimental Economics 14, no. 4 (2011): 583-
610. 
 
Engelmann, Dirk, and Martin Strobel. “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences 
in simple distribution experiments.” American economic review 94, no. 4 (2004): 857-869. 
 
Erez, Amir, and Alice M. Isen. “The influence of positive affect on the components of expectancy 
motivation.” Journal of Applied psychology 87, no. 6 (2002): 1055. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. “Third-party punishment and social norms.” Evolution and 
human behavior 25, no. 2 (2004): 63-87. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, Michael Naef, and Klaus M. Schmidt. “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin 
preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment.” American Economic Review 96, 
no. 5 (2006): 1912-1917. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. “Altruistic punishment in humans.” Nature 415, no. 6868 (2002): 
137-140. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. “A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.” The 
quarterly journal of economics 114, no. 3 (1999): 817-868. 
 
Fehr-Duda, Helga, Thomas Epper, Adrian Bruhin, and Renate Schubert. “Risk and rationality: The 
effects of mood and decision rules on probability weighting.” Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 78, no. 1-2 (2011): 14-24. 
 
Forker, O. D., and Ronald W. Ward. “Generic advertising: a marketing strategy for farmer groups.” 
The... Yearbook of agriculture (USA) (1988). 
 
Franzen, Axel, and Sonja Pointner. “Anonymity in the dictator game revisited.” Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 81, no. 1 (2012): 74-81. 
 
Frey, Bruno S., and Iris Bohnet. “Institutions affect fairness: Experimental investigations.” Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft (1995): 286-303. 
 
Fischbacher, Urs, Simon Gächter, and Ernst Fehr. “Are people conditionally cooperative? 
Evidence from a public goods experiment.” Economics letters 71, no. 3 (2001): 397-404. 
 
Fischbacher, Urs. “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.” Experimental 
economics 10, no. 2 (2007): 171-178. 
 
  107 
Fischbacher, Urs, and Simon Gächter. “Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding 
in public goods experiments.” The American economic review 100, no. 1 (2010): 541-556. 
 
Fisher, Joseph, R. Mark Isaac, Jeffrey W. Schatzberg, and James M. Walker. “Heterogenous 
demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism.” Public 
Choice 85, no. 3-4 (1995): 249-266. 
 
Halek, Martin, and Joseph G. Eisenhauer. “Demography of risk aversion.” Journal of Risk and 
Insurance (2001): 1-24. 
 
Hamilton, Stephen F., Timothy J. Richards, and Kyle W. Stiegert. “How does advertising affect 
market performance? The case of generic advertising.” In 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 
2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, no. 49187. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 
2009. 
 
Harrison, Glenn W., and E. Elisabet Rutström. “Risk aversion in the laboratory.” In Risk aversion 
in experiments, pp. 41-196. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008. 
 
Hartog, Joop, Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Nicole Jonker. “Linking measured risk aversion to 
individual characteristics.” Kyklos 55, no. 1 (2002): 3-26. 
 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith. “Preferences, property 
rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.” Games and Economic behavior 7, no. 3 (1994): 
346-380. 
 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith. “Social distance and other-regarding 
behavior in dictator games.” The American Economic Review 86, no. 3 (1996): 653-660. 
 
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. “Risk aversion and incentive effects.” American economic 
review 92, no. 5 (2002): 1644-1655. 
 
Ifcher, John, and Homa Zarghamee. “Happiness and time preference: The effect of positive affect 
in a random-assignment experiment.” American Economic Review 101, no. 7 (2011): 3109-29. 
 
Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker. “Communication and free-riding behavior: The voluntary 
contribution mechanism.” Economic inquiry 26, no. 4 (1988): 585-608. 
 
Isaac, R. Mark, and James M. Walker. “Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary 
contributions mechanism.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1988): 179-199. 
 
Isaac, R. Mark, James M. Walker, and Arlington W. Williams. “Group size and the voluntary 
provision of public goods: Experimental evidence utilizing large groups.” Journal of Public 
Economics 54, no. 1 (1994): 1-36. 
 
Isen, Alice M. “Some ways in which positive affect influences decision making and problem 
solving.” Handbook of emotions 3 (2008): 548-573. 
  108 
 
Isen, Alice M., and Nehemia Geva. “The influence of positive affect on acceptable level of risk: 
The person with a large canoe has a large worry.” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 39, no. 2 (1987): 145-154. 
 
Isen, Alice M., and Robert Patrick. “The effect of positive feelings on risk taking: When the chips 
are down.” Organizational behavior and human performance 31, no. 2 (1983): 194-202. 
 
Johnson, Eric J., and Amos Tversky. “Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk.” Journal 
of personality and social psychology 45, no. 1 (1983): 20. 
 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata. “Internal auditing and voluntary cooperation in 
firms: A cross-cultural experiment.” Accounting Review (1997): 407-431. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Jack L. Knetsch. “Valuing public goods: the purchase of moral 
satisfaction.” Journal of environmental economics and management 22, no. 1 (1992): 57-70. 
 
Kahyaoglu, Mehmet Burak, and Özgür Ican. “Risk Aversion and Emotions in DoND.” 
International Journal of Economics and Finance 9, no. 1 (2016): 32. 
 
Kaiser, Harry M., Olan D. Forker, John Lenz, and Chin-Hwa Sun. “Evaluating generic dairy 
advertising impacts on retail, wholesale, and farm milk markets.” Journal of Agricultural 
Economics Research 44, no. 4 (1994): 3-17. 
 
Keser, Claudia, and Frans Van Winden. “Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to 
public goods.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102, no. 1 (2000): 23-39. 
 
Kliger, Doron, and Ori Levy. “Mood-induced variation in risk preferences.” Journal of economic 
behavior & organization 52, no. 4 (2003): 573-584. 
 
Kirchsteiger, Georg, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini. “Your morals might be your moods.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 59, no. 2 (2006): 155-172. 
 
Koch, Alexander K., and Hans-Theo Normann. “Giving in dictator games: Regard for others or 
regard by others?” Southern Economic Journal (2008): 223-231. 
 
Kosfeld, Michael, Akira Okada, and Arno Riedl. “Institution formation in public goods 
games.” The American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (2009): 1335-1355. 
 
Krupka, Erin L., and Roberto A. Weber. “Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why 
does dictator game sharing vary?” Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. 3 
(2013): 495-524. 
 
Kring A.M. Gender and Anger. In A.H. Fischer (Ed.), “Gender and emotion: Social psychological 
perspectives.” Studies in emotion and social interaction. Second series, (2000): 211-231.  
 
  109 
Kugler, Tamar, Terry Connolly, and Lisa D. Ordóñez. “Emotion, decision, and risk: Betting on 
gambles versus betting on people.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25, no. 2 (2012): 
123-134. 
 
Lerner, Jennifer S., Deborah A. Small, and George Loewenstein. “Heart strings and purse strings: 
Carryover effects of emotions on economic decisions.” Psychological science 15, no. 5 (2004): 
337-341. 
 
Levine, David K. “Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments.” Review of economic 
dynamics 1, no. 3 (1998): 593-622. 
 
List, John A. “On the interpretation of giving in dictator games.” Journal of Political economy 
115, no. 3 (2007): 482-493. 
 
List, John A., Azeem M. Shaikh, and Yang Xu. “Multiple hypothesis testing in experimental 
economics.” No. w21875. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 
 
List, John A., and Todd L. Cherry. “Examining the role of fairness in high stakes allocation 
decisions.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65, no. 1 (2008): 1-8. 
 
Loomes, Graham, Peter G. Moffatt, and Robert Sugden. “A microeconometric test of alternative 
stochastic theories of risky choice.” Journal of risk and Uncertainty 24, no. 2 (2002): 103-130. 
 
Mano, Haim. “Judgments under distress: Assessing the role of unpleasantness and arousal in 
judgment formation.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 52, no. 2 
(1992): 216-245. 
 
Merlino, Luca Paolo, and Kinateder Markus. “Public Goods in Endogenous Networks.” American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2017): forthcoming. 
 
Messer, Kent, Harry M. Kaiser, and William Schulze. “The Problem of Generic Advertising: An 
Experimental Analysis.” Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell 
University (2004). 
 
Messer, Kent D., Harry M. Kaiser, and William D. Schulze. “The problem of free riding in 
voluntary generic advertising: parallelism and possible solutions from the lab.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 90, no. 2 (2008): 540-552. 
 
Nguyen, Yen, and Charles N. Noussair. “Risk aversion and emotions.” Pacific economic review 
19, no. 3 (2014): 296-312. 
 
Nygren, Thomas E., Alice M. Isen, Pamela J. Taylor, and Jessica Dulin. “The influence of positive 
affect on the decision rule in risk situations: Focus on outcome (and especially avoidance of 
loss) rather than probability.” Organizational behavior and human decision processes 66, no. 
1 (1996): 59-72. 
 
  110 
Oxoby, Robert J., and John Spraggon. “Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65, no. 3-4 (2008): 703-713. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas R., and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey. “Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: 
How much and why?” The American Economic Review (1997): 829-846. 
 
Park, Eun-Soo. “Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects 
on free-riding.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43, no. 4 (2000): 405-421. 
 
Rigdon, Mary, Keiko Ishii, Motoki Watabe, and Shinobu Kitayama. “Minimal social cues in the 
dictator game.” Journal of Economic Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 358-367. 
 
Rusting, Cheryl L., and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema. “Regulating responses to anger: effects of 
rumination and distraction on angry mood.” Journal of personality and social psychology 74, 
no. 3 (1998): 790. 
 
Schurter, Karl, and Bart J. Wilson. “Justice and fairness in the dictator game.” Southern Economic 
Journal 76, no. 1 (2009): 130-145. 
 
Schurter, Karl, and Bart J. Wilson. “Justice and fairness in the dictator game.” Southern Economic 
Journal 76, no. 1 (2009): 130-145. 
 
Spies, K., F. W. Hesse, and F. Brandes. “Influence of positive mood on risk-taking behavior.” 
Psychologische beitrage 39 (1997): 216-228. 
 
Sugden, Robert. “Reciprocity: the supply of public goods through voluntary contributions.” The 
Economic Journal 94, no. 376 (1984): 772-787. 
 
Treffers, Theresa, Philipp Koellinger, and Arnold Oskar Picot. “In the Mood for Risk? A Random-
Assignment Experiment Addressing the Effects of Moods on Risk Preferences.” (2012). 
 
Viola, Paul, and Michael J. Jones. “Robust real-time face detection.” International journal of 
computer vision 57, no. 2 (2004): 137-154. 
 
Ward, Ron W. “Understanding the US generic advertising system and its role in information 
management among commodities and food systems.” International Journal on Food System 
Dynamics 1, no. 3 (2010): 204-211. 
 
Williams, Gary W., Oral Capps Jr, and David A. Bessler. “Florida orange grower returns from 
orange juice advertising.” TAMRC Consumer and Product Research Report No. CP-01-04, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University (2004). 
 
Yuen, Kenneth SL, and Tatia MC Lee. “Could mood state affect risk-taking decisions?” Journal 
of affective disorders 75, no. 1 (2003): 11-18. 
 
  111 
Zeng, Zhihong, Maja Pantic, Glenn I. Roisman, and Thomas S. Huang. “A survey of affect 
recognition methods: Audio, visual, and spontaneous expressions.” IEEE transactions on 
pattern analysis and machine intelligence 31, no. 1 (2009): 39-58. 
 
Zheng, Yuqing, Talia Bar, and Harry M. Kaiser. “Generic advertising in an asymmetric Cournot 






















  112 
APPENDIX A 
 
A1. Experimental Instructions for Public Goods Experiment 
The following instructions were computerized using Z-tree software.  
 
SCREEN 1: General Instructions 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in today’s session! 
 
You will receive a $5 show-up fee for your participation in this experiment. You may receive 
additional payments depending on the outcomes of the experiment.  
 
As a reminder before we start today’s session, your participation is completely voluntary. At any 
time, you may elect to end your participation. However, in order to receive any monetary 
payments, you must complete the whole session. All information collected today will be kept 
confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research. 
 
Before you begin, please make sure that your cellphone is turned off and all of your belongings 
are placed beside you on the floor. Please remain quiet and keep your eyes on your screen for the 
duration of the experiment. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and a session monitor will come to assist you, 
otherwise please press the continue button below: 
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SCREEN 2: Instructions for Public Goods Game 
This study is aimed at understanding individual decision making in interactive settings. The 
experiment consists of 2 practice rounds followed by 10 real rounds. In each round, you will be 
randomly placed in a group of participants, where each participant is required to make an 
investment decision. You payoff in each round will depend on the investment decisions that you 
and the other 3 members of your group make in that round.  
 
The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully and make good investment decisions you 
can earn a considerable amount of money from this experiment. 
 
One of the 10 real rounds will be chosen randomly as the binding round to determine the payments. 
You will be paid, in cash, based on your earnings in the binding round. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 3: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued – Treatments 1 & 2 
You will participate in a total of 12 rounds (2 practice and 10 real). In each round, you will be 
randomly assigned to a group of 4 members. Each member will be endowed with 750 tokens (250 
for low-income individuals) and must decide how he wants to divide those tokens between two 
accounts: 
1) Private account 
2) Group account 
The composition of your group will change every round. Each round, you will be randomly 
reassigned to a new group of 4 members. At no point in the experiment will the identities of the 
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other group members be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. In other words, 
the group members will remain anonymous to one another.  
 
You will be endowed with 750 tokens (250 for low-income individuaks) in every period and must 
decide how many tokens to invest in the private account and how many tokens to invest in the 
public account. Information about the two accounts is elaborated in the next screen. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 3: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued – Treatments 3 & 4 
You will participate in a total of 12 rounds (2 practice and 10 real). In each round, you will be 
randomly assigned to a group of 4 members. Each member will be endowed with a certain amount 
of tokens (between 100 and 900) and must decide how he wants to divide those tokens between 
two accounts: 
1) Private account 
2) Group account 
The composition of your group will change every round. Each round, you will be randomly 
reassigned to a new group of 4 members. At no point in the experiment will the identities of the 
other group members be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to them. In other words, 
the group members will remain anonymous to one another.  
 
You will be endowed with the same amount of tokens in every period and must decide how many 
tokens to invest in the private account and how many tokens to invest in the public account. 
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Information about the two accounts is elaborated in the next screen. You will not know the number 
of tokens that each of the other members of your group was endowed with. Each member will only 
know his own endowment and the average endowment of the group. your endowment in ever 
round is 750 tokens (250 for low-income individuals) and the average endowment of your group 
in every round is 500 tokens.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 4: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued. 
Private Account: 
Every token you invest in the private account will yield you a return of one cent. The other 
members in your group will earn nothing from your investment in the private account. Below are 
a few examples to illustrate: 
 
Example 1: Suppose you choose to invest 200 tokens in the private account. Then you will get 200 
cents from this account and the other members of your group will not be affected. 
Example 2: Suppose you choose to invest 100 tokens in the private account. Then you will get 100 
cents from this account and the other members of your group will not be affected. 
Example 3: Suppose you choose to invest 0 tokens in the private account. Then you will get 0 cents 
from this account and the other members of your group will not be affected. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
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SCREEN 5: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued – Treatment 1 & 2 
Public Account: 
Every token you invest in the public account will yield a return of half a cent to each member of 
your group. Also, every token that any of the other members of your group invest in the public 
account will yield a return of half a cent to each member of your group. This means that your 
return from the public account will depend on the total number of tokens that you and the other 
members of your group invest in this account. The more the group invests in the public account, 
the greater the return to each member of the group. Below are a few examples to illustrate: 
 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 0 tokens in the public account and the other five members of your 
group invest a total of 400 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
by your group in the public account is 400 which means that every member of your group earns 
400X0.5=200 cents from the public account. 
Example 2: Suppose you invest 100 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 0 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
by your group in the public account is 100 which means that every member of your group earns 
100X0.5=50 cents from the public account. 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 200 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 300 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens 
invested by your group in the public account is 500 which means that every member of your group 
earns 500X0.5=250 cents from the public account. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
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SCREEN 5: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued – Treatment 3 
Public Account: 
Every token you invest in the public account will yield a return to each member of your group. 
Also, every token that any of the other members of your group invest in the public account will 
yield a return to each member of your group. This means that your return from the public account 
will depend on the total number of tokens that you and the other members of your group invest in 
this account. The more the group invests in the public account, the greater the return to each 
member of the group.  
 
Each member’s return from every token invested in the public account is directly proportional to 
his endowment and is equal in cents to 0.01X(the member’s endowment of tokens). This means 
that the higher your endowment, the higher the return that you get from each token that you or any 
of your group members invest in the public account. So for example if your endowment is 300 
tokens then you get 0.30 cents from every token that your group invests in the public account, 
while if your endowment is 600 tokens then you get 0.60 cents from every token that your group 
invests in the public account. Since your endowment of tokens if 750 (250 for low-income 
individuals), you will receive 0.75 cents (0.25 for low-income individuals) from every token that 
you or any of your group members invest in the public account. Below are a few examples to 
illustrate: 
 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 0 tokens in the public account and the other five members of your 
group invest a total of 400 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
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by your group in the public account is 400 which means that every member of your group earns 
400X0.75=300 cents from the public account. 
Example 2: Suppose you invest 100 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 0 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
by your group in the public account is 100 which means that every member of your group earns 
100X0.75=75 cents from the public account. 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 200 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 300 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens 
invested by your group in the public account is 500 which means that every member of your group 
earns 500X0.75=375 cents from the public account. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 5: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued – Treatment 4 
Public Account: 
Every token you invest in the public account will yield a return to each member of your group. 
Also, every token that any of the other members of your group invest in the public account will 
yield a return to each member of your group. This means that your return from the public account 
will depend on the total number of tokens that you and the other members of your group invest in 
this account. The more the group invests in the public account, the greater the return to each 
member of the group.  
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Each member’s return from every token invested in the public account is inversely proportional to 
his endowment and is equal in cents to 0.01X(1000-the member’s endowment of tokens). This 
means that the higher your endowment, the lower the return that you get from each token that you 
or any of your group members invest in the public account. So for example if your endowment is 
300 tokens then you get 0.70 cents from every token that your group invests in the public account, 
while if your endowment is 800 tokens then you get 0.20 cents from every token your group invests 
in the public account. Since your endowment of tokens if 750 (250 for low-income individuals), 
you will receive 0.25 cents (0.75 for low-income individuals) from every token that you or any of 
your group members invest in the public account. Below are a few examples to illustrate: 
 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 0 tokens in the public account and the other five members of your 
group invest a total of 400 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
by your group in the public account is 400 which means that every member of your group earns 
400X0.25=100 cents from the public account. 
Example 2: Suppose you invest 100 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 0 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens invested 
by your group in the public account is 100 which means that every member of your group earns 
100X0.25=25 cents from the public account. 
Example 1: Suppose you invest 200 tokens in the public account and the other five members of 
your group invest a total of 300 tokens in the public account. Then the total number of tokens 
invested by your group in the public account is 500 which means that every member of your group 
earns 500X0.25=125 cents from the public account. 
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Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 6: Instructions for Public Goods Game Continued. 
Your decisions and earnings in every period are confidential! This means that you will not be given 
information about the investment decisions or earnings of any of your group members, nor will 
they be given information about your investment decisions or earnings. So you must make your 
decision without knowing what the other members in your group are deciding. After each period, 
the only information you will be given is 
• Number of tokens you invested in the public account 
• Total number of tokens invested by your group (including you) in the public account 
• Your earnings for the round 
At the end of today’s session, one of the 10 real rounds will be randomly chosen as the binding 
round. You will be paid based on your earnings in this binding round. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 7: Decision Input – Practice Round 
This is round 1 of the 2 practice rounds. The decisions you make in the practice rounds are 
hypothetical. Those rounds are only intended to familiarize you with how your investment 
decisions and the investment decisions of the other members in your group determine your 
payment for the round. 
 
In the two boxes below, please enter the number of tokens you would like to invest in the private 
and public accounts respectively. You are free to invest some tokens in the private account and 
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some in the public account. Alternatively, you can invest all of your tokens in the private account 
or all of them in the public account.  
 
You are only allowed to invest an integer number (whole number) in the private and public 
accounts and so you cannot choose to invest 15.5 tokens for example. Also, please make sure that 
your investment in the private account plus your investment in the public account equals the total 
number of tokens you have (750 tokens). 
 
Number of tokens you like to invest in private account:  ______________ 
Number of tokens you like to invest in public account:         ______________ 
 
Once you have made your decision please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 7: Decision Input – Real Round 
This is round 1 of the 10 real rounds. The decisions you make in the real rounds are NOT 
hypothetical. At the end of the experiment, one of the real rounds will be randomly chosen as 
binding. You will be paid based on your earnings in the binding round. 
 
In the two boxes below, please enter the number of tokens you would like to invest in the private 
and public accounts respectively. You are free to invest some tokens in the private account and 
some in the public account. Alternatively, you can invest all of your tokens in the private account 
or all of them in the public account.  
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You are only allowed to invest an integer number (whole number) in the private and public 
accounts and so you cannot choose to invest 15.5 tokens for example. Also, please make sure that 
your investment in the private account plus your investment in the public account equals the total 
number of tokens you have (750 tokens). 
 
Number of tokens you like to invest in private account:        ______________ 
Number of tokens you like to invest in public account:         ______________ 
 
Once you have made your decision please press the continue button below. 
 
SCREEN 8: Outcome 
The number of tokens you invested in the private account                            ________ 
The number of tokens you invested in the public account.                            ________ 
Total number of tokens invested by your group in the public account          ________       
Your payoff from the private account                                                            ________ 
Your payoff from the public account                                                             ________ 
Your total payoff for this round                                                                     ________ 
This concludes period XXX. Please press the continue button below to advance to the next period. 
 
SCREEN 9: Next Period Intro 
Before we start period XXX please remember the following: 
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• The composition of your group changes every period. Each period, you are randomly 
reassigned to a new group of 4 members. 
• You have 750 tokens available each period and you have to decide how to divide those 
tokens between the private and public accounts. 
• Every dollar invested in the private account yields one cent only to the person who invested 
it 
• Every dollar invested in the public account yields half a cent to every member in the group. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions, otherwise please press the continue button below. 
 
A2. Theoretical Model of High-Income Individuals: 
This section applies similar reasoning to the one adopted in the theoretical framework section to 
explain potential changes in the behavior of high-income individuals resulting from the 
introduction of heterogeneity in income and relative return. The payoff of a high-income individual 
playing in a separated income group can be written as: 
  
                                              Y4Z = ([4Z − ]4Z) + &]4Z + &∑ ]VZ(]̅)V`a-                                     (33) 
 
while his payoff when in a mixed income group is given by 
 
                                  b4Z = ([4Z − ]4Z) + &]4Z + &!]VZ(]̅) + &c ∑ ]'d(]̅)e'a- .                          (34) 
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Hence, we can represent the change is his payoff if he increases his contribution from ]f4Z  in the 
separated income group and ]g4Z  in the mixed income group by the following equation: 
 						∆Y4Z = i]f4Z − ]g4Z j + &i]g4Z − ]f4Z j + &k!]VZ(]̅g) − ]VZ(]̅f)l + &[c ∑ ]'d(]̅g) −e'a- ∑ ]mZ(]̅f)ema- ]        (35) 
 
Similarly, the change in his payoff if he/she decreases his contribution from ]n4Z  to ]o4Z    is given 
by: 
 				∆Y4Z = i]f4Z − ]o4Z j + &i]o4Z − ]f4Z j + &k!]VZ(]̅o) − ]VZ(]̅f)l + &kc ∑ ]'d(]̅o) −e'a- ∑ ]mZ(]̅f)ema- l  (26) 
 
while the change in his payoff resulting from a no change in contribution can be written as: 
 
                      ∆Y4Z = &k!]VZ(]̅f) − ]VZ(]̅f)l + &[c ∑ ]'d(]̅f) −e'a- ∑ ]mZ(]̅f)ema- ].                   (27) 
 
Given the above equation, we can follow the same thought process presented in the theoretical 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1. Experimental Instructions for the Dictator Game Experiment 
These instructions were presented in paper for to the subjects. The instructions differed based on 
the treatment. 
Introductory Instructions 
Welcome! Thank you for participating in today’s session! 
 
You will receive a $5 show-up fee for your participation in this experiment. You may receive 
additional payments depending on the outcomes of the experiment.  
 
When you entered the room you received this packet of information. To aid in identification, your 
ID number for the experiment is written in the upper right-hand corner of each sheet. The use of 
identification numbers ensures individual confidentiality. As a reminder before we start today’s 
session, your participation is completely voluntary. At any time, you may elect to end your 
participation. However, in order to receive any monetary payments, you must complete the whole 
session. All information collected today will be kept confidential and will not be used for any 
purpose other than this research. 
 
Before you begin, please make sure that your cellphone is turned off and all of your belongings 
are placed beside you on the floor. Please remain quiet and keep your eyes on your paper for the 
duration of the experiment. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
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All of the instructions you will need are written in this packet. If you have any questions at any 
point in time, please raise your hand and a session monitor will come to assist you. 
Die-Roll Task (Fake Entitlement Treatment) 
In this part of the experiment, you are required to make one die roll. Your goal is to get the highest 
number. The outcome of the next part of the experiment depends on your performance here, so the 
higher the number you get in your die roll the better. You will have two choices to make as follows: 
First, you will choose from 4 different dice the one you would like to play with. The four dice are 
as follows: 
1. Large Die 
2. Medium Die 
3. Small Die 
4. Extra Small Die 
Please circle the die that you would like to roll. 
Second, you will choose from the following 2 options where you would like to roll you die: 
1. Open Space (the desk in front of you) 
2. Closed Space (a small box will be provided) 
Please circle the option you prefer. 
When you are done choosing which die you want to roll and where you would like to roll it, please 
wait for a session monitor to provide you with the preferred die and rolling space. This might take 
a few minutes so please be patient. 
After you are done rolling, please stay seated and remain quiet. The session monitor will provide 
you with further instructions shortly. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
General Knowledge Quiz (Real Entitlement Treatment) 
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In this part of the experiment, you will have 10 minutes to answer 10 general knowledge questions. 
Your goal is to correctly answer as many questions as you can. The outcome of the next part of 
this experiment depends on your performance here, so the higher the number of correct answers 
you get the better.  
You may not use any external sources (like books, phone, internet, etc.) for help when 
attempting to answer those questions. 
Please circle your answer clearly for each of the questions below. 
1. Grand Central Terminal, Park Avenue, New York is the world’s 
a. Largest railway station 
b. Highest railway station 
c. Longest railway station 
d. None of the above 
 
2. Entomology is the science that studies 
a. Behavior of human beings 
b. Insects 
c. The origin and history of technical and scientific terms 
d. The formation of rocks 
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d. Australia 
 
4. Exposure to sunlight helps a person improve his health because 
a. The infrared light kills bacteria in the body 
b. Resistance power increases 
c. The pigment cells in the skin get stimulated and produce a healthy tan 
d. The ultraviolet rays convert skin oil into Vitamin D 
 
5. Each year World Red Cross and Red Crescent Day is celebrated on 
a. May 8 
b. May 18 
c. June 8 
d. June 18 
 
6. Federation Cup, World Cup, Allywyn International Trophy, and Challenge Cup are awarded 
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7. Germany signed the Armistice Treaty on ______ and World War I ended 
a. January 19, 1918 
b. May 30, 1918 
c. November 11, 1918 
d. February 15, 1918 
 
8. The Ozone layer restricts 
a. Visible light 
b. Infrared radiation 
c. X-rays and gamma rays 
d. Ultraviolet radiation 
 
9. Headquarters of UNO are situated at 
a. New York, USA 
b. Hague, Netherlands 
c. Geneva, Switzerland 
d. Paris, France 
 
10. During the first crusade, crusaders reached Jerusalem and captured it in 
a. 1000 AD 
b. 1200 AD 
c. 1099 AD 
d. 1515 AD 
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When you are done, please wait for a session monitor to come and collect your sheet. After that, 
the session monitor will be back shortly with further instructions. This may take a few minutes so 
please be patient and stay seated. Also, please remain quiet and do not speak with any of the 
participants. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
Decision-Making Task – Control Group – Decision-Makers 
In this experiment, you have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You 
will not be told who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told 
who they were matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain 
anonymous to one another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and 
cannot be linked to you in any way.  
Based on a random, 50/50 chance lottery you were selected to participate as the decision maker in 
this game, which means that the person you were matched with will participate as the receiver. 
Aside from the $5 show-up fee that each of you will be given for participating in this experiment, 
you have been endowed with an additional $10. However, the person you were matched with (the 
receiver) has not been endowed with an additional $10. 
Your decision is simple: decide what portion of this $10, if any, you would like to transfer to the 
person you were matched with (the receiver). Your choice can be anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 
increments. Your take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your $5 show-up 
fee and the money you decide to keep for yourself out of this additional $10 endowment. Similarly, 
the take-home earnings of the person you were matched with (the receiver) will be the sum of his 
$5 show-up fee and the money you decided to transfer to him out of the additional $10 endowment. 
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You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 




Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
your form and hand you further instructions. 
Decision-Making Task – Control Group – Receivers 
In this experiment, you have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You 
will not be told who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told 
who they were matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain 
anonymous to one another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and 
cannot be linked to you in any way.  
Based on a random, 50/50 chance lottery you were selected to participate as the receiver in this 
experiment, which means that the person you were matched with will participate as the decision 
maker. Aside from the $5 show-up fee that each of you will be given for participating in this 
experiment, the person you were matched with (the decision maker) has been endowed with an 
additional $10. However, you have not been endowed with this additional $10. 
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The decision maker will decide what portion of his $10 endowment, if any, he would like to 
transfer to you. He can choose anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 increments. Your take-home 
earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your $5 show-up fee and the amount of money 
the decision maker decides to transfer to you out of his additional $10 endowment. Similarly, his 
take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of his $5 show-up fee and the amount of 
money he chooses to keep for himself out of the additional $10 endowment. 
Your task is simple: you will have to choose how much you expect the decision maker will transfer 
to you out of his additional $10 endowment. 
You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 
circle your choice below: 
 
 
Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
your form and hand you further instructions. 
Decision-Making Task – Fake Entitlement – Decision-Makers 
You have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You will not be told 
who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told who they were 
matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain anonymous to one 
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another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you 
in any way.  
Based on the results of the die roll in the previous part of the experiment, one of you will be 
assigned the role of the decision-maker while the other will be assigned the role of the receiver. 
The person you are matched with has also made decisions about which die he would like to roll 
and where he would like to roll his die. The person who rolled the higher number will act as the 
decision maker and the one who rolled the lower number will act as the receiver. Since you rolled 
a _____ and the person you are matched with rolled a _____, you have been selected to participate 
as the decision maker in this experiment, which means that the person you are matched with will 
participate as the receiver. Aside from the $5 show-up fee that each of you will be given for 
participating in this experiment, you have been endowed with an additional $10. However, the 
person you were matched with (the receiver) has not been endowed with an additional $10. 
Your decision is simple: decide what portion of this $10, if any, you would like to transfer to the 
person you were matched with (the receiver). Your choice can be anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 
increments. Your take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of the $5 show-up fee 
and the money you decide to keep for yourself out of this additional $10 endowment. Similarly, 
the take-home earnings of the person you were matched with (the receiver) will be the sum of his 
$5 show-up fee and the money you decided to transfer to him out of the additional $10 endowment. 
You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
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Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 
circle your transfer below: 
 
 
Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
your form and hand you further instructions. 
Decision-Making Task – Fake Entitlement – Receivers  
You have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You will not be told 
who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told who they were 
matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain anonymous to one 
another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you 
in any way.  
Based on the results of the die roll in the previous part of the experiment, one of you will be 
assigned the role of the decision-maker while the other will be assigned the role of the receiver. 
The person you are matched with has also made decisions about which die he would like to roll 
and where he would like to roll his die. The person who rolled the higher number will act as the 
decision maker and the one who rolled the lower number will act as the receiver. Since you rolled 
a _____ and the person you are matched with rolled a _____, you have been selected to participate 
as the receiver in this experiment, which means that the person you are matched with will 
participate as the decision-maker. Aside from the $5 show-up fee that each of you will be given 
for participating in this experiment, the person you were matched with (the decision maker) has 
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been endowed with an additional $10. However, you have not been endowed with this additional 
$10. 
The decision maker will decide what portion of his $10 endowment, if any, he would like to 
transfer to you. He can choose anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 increments. Your take-home 
earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your $5 show-up fee and the amount of money 
the decision maker decides to transfer to you out of his additional $10 endowment. Similarly, his 
take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of his $5 show-up fee and the amount of 
money he chooses to keep for himself out of the additional $10 endowment. 
Your task is simple: you will have to choose how much you expect the decision maker will transfer 
to you out of his additional $10 endowment. 
You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 
circle your choice below: 
 
 
Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
your form and hand you further instructions. 
Decision-Making Task – Real Entitlement – Decision-Makers 
You have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You will not be told 
who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told who they were 
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matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain anonymous to one 
another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you 
in any way.  
Based on the results of the knowledge quiz in the previous part of the experiment, one of you will 
be assigned the role of the decision-maker while the other will be assigned the role of the receiver. 
The person you are matched with has answered the exact same questions as you. The person with 
more correct answers will act as the decision-maker and the one with less correct answers will act 
as the receiver. Since you had _____ correct answers and the person you were matched with had 
_____ correct answers, you have been selected to participate as the decision-maker, which means 
that the person you were matched with will participate as the receiver. Aside from the $5 show-up 
fee that each of you will be given for participating in this experiment, you have been endowed 
with an additional $10. However, the person you were matched with (the receiver) has not been 
endowed with an additional $10. 
Your decision is simple: decide what portion of this $10, if any, you would like to transfer to the 
person you were matched with (the receiver). Your choice can be anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 
increments. Your take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your $5 show-up 
fee and the money you decide to keep for yourself out of this additional $10 endowment. Similarly, 
the take-home earnings of the person you were matched with (the receiver) will be the sum of his 
$5 show-up fee and the money you decided to transfer to him out of the additional $10 endowment. 
You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
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Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 
circle your transfer below: 
 
 
Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
your form and hand you further instructions. 
Decision-Making Task – Real Entitlement – Receivers 
You have been randomly paired with another participant in another room. You will not be told 
who you were matched with during or after the experiment, nor will he/she be told who they were 
matched with during or after the experiment. That is, the pairs will remain anonymous to one 
another. Most importantly, your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you 
in any way.  
Based on the results of the knowledge quiz in the previous part of the experiment, one of you will 
be assigned the role of the decision-maker while the other will be assigned the role of the receiver. 
The person you are matched with has answered the exact same questions as you. The person with 
more correct answers will act as the decision-maker and the one with less correct answers will act 
as the receiver. Since you had _____ correct answers and the person you were matched with had 
_____ correct answers, you have been selected to participate as the receiver, which means that the 
person you were matched with will participate as the decision-maker. Aside from the $5 show-up 
fee that each of you will be given for participating in this experiment, the person you were matched 
with (the decision maker) has been endowed with an additional $10. However, you have not been 
endowed with this additional $10. 
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The decision maker will decide what portion of his $10 endowment, if any, he would like to 
transfer to you. He can choose anywhere from $0 to $10 in $0.5 increments. Your take-home 
earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your $5 show-up fee and the amount of money 
the decision maker decides to transfer to you out of his additional $10 endowment. Similarly, his 
take-home earnings from this experiment will be the sum of his $5 show-up fee and the amount of 
money he chooses to keep for himself out of the additional $10 endowment. 
Your task is simple: you will have to choose how much you expect the decision maker will transfer 
to you out of his additional $10 endowment. 
You have 5 minutes to come up with a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to any 
participants before the session is over. Also, do not be concerned if others in the room finish before 
you, we will not collect the forms until after 5 minutes. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions or need further explanation. Otherwise, please 
circle your choice below: 
 
 
Once you are done, please stay seated and remain quiet. A session monitor will come to collect 
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APPENDIX C 
 
C1. Experimental Instructions for Risk Preference Experiment 
Those instructions were computerized using iMotions software. The order of the slides was 
changed depending on the treatment. 
 
Screen 1 – Diluted Group 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating in today’s session. The session will proceed in several stages as 
follows: 
Stage 1: Video 
Stage 2: Survey 1 
Stage 3: Choice Task 1 
Stage 4: Choice Task 2 
Stage 5: Survey 2 
Stage 6: Receive Payment 
Press <Enter> to continue… 
 
Screen 1 – Undiluted Group 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating in today’s session. The session will proceed in several stages as 
follows: 
Stage 1: Video 
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Stage 2: Choice Task 1 
Stage 3: Choice Task 2 
Stage 4: Survey 1 
Stage 5: Survey 2 
Stage 6: Receive Payment 




This stage will proceed as follows: 
1. You will watch a video of approximately 5 minutes of duration 
2. You are required to pay close attention to the video 
3. You will automatically proceed to the next stage once the video is over 




This stage will proceed as follows: 
1. You will be presented with questions regarding your current state of mind 
2. For each question, you will rate how strongly you are currently feeling the specific state of 
mind 
3. You will answer on a scale of 1 to 5 (1=very slightly or not at all, 5=extremely) 
Press <Enter> to continue… 
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Screen 4 
How “happy” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “amused” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “distressed” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “excited” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 
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Screen 8 
How “upset” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “strong” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “guilty” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “angry” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 
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Screen 12 
How “hostile” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “enthusiastic” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “proud” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “irritable” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 
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Screen 16 
How “sad” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “ashamed” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “interested” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “nervous” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 
(very slightly or not at all)              (a little)                       (moderately)                     (quite a bit)                    (extremely) 
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Screen 20 
How “determined” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “attentive” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “jittery” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




How “active” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 
(very slightly or not at all)              (a little)                       (moderately)                     (quite a bit)                    (extremely) 
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Screen 24 
How “afraid” do you currently feel? 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5 




Choice Task 1 
This stage will proceed as follows: 
• You will be presented with a series of 10 choices 
• Each choice contains two alternatives (A and B) 
• Each alternative is a lottery that pays one of two possible outcomes 
• You have to choose the alternative you prefer from each choice set 
• There is no right or wrong answer, you simply have to choose the alternative you prefer 
• This task might be chosen at the end of the experiment as binding. 
• If this is the binding task, one of the 10 choice sets will be randomly chosen and you will 
be paid based on the outcome of the alternative you chose in this choice set 
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Screen 36 
This stage will proceed as follows: 
 
1. You will be presented with a choice set containing 6 alternatives. 
2. Each alternative is a 50/50 lottery that pays one of two outcomes. 
3. You have to choose the alternative you prefer from this set. 
4. There is no right or wrong answer, you simply have to choose the alternative you prefer. 
5. This task might be chosen at the end of the experiment as binding. 
6. If this is the binding task, then you will play the lottery you chose and you will be paid 






Thank you for your participation! 
Please wait for a session monitor for further instruction 
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C2. Holt-Laury Decisions Using Overall Sample of Participants 
 















Safe Choices Implied CRRA Range
Neutral (n=30) Positive (n=30) Negative (n=29) Neutral (n=32) Positive (n=33) Negative (n=31)
0 r < -1.71 0.00 0.00 3.45 6.25 12.12 0.00
1 -1.71 < r < -0.95 0.00 3.33 0.00 3.125 0.00 0.00
2 -0.95 < r < -0.49 3.33 10.00 3.45 6.25 0.00 3.23
3 -0.49 < r < -0.14 3.33 16.67 10.34 12.5 18.18 16.13
4 -0.14 < r < 0.15 16.67 20.00 17.24 21.875 18.18 22.58
5 0.15 < r < 0.41 10.00 16.67 6.90 9.375 6.06 9.68
6 0.41 < r < 0.68 23.33 16.67 27.59 12.5 12.12 19.35
7 0.68 < r < 0.97 23.33 6.67 20.69 15.625 3.03 9.68
8 0.97 < r < 1.37 10.00 3.33 6.90 12.5 24.24 12.90
9-10 1.37 < r 10.00 6.67 3.45 0 6.06 6.45
Fraction of Choices (%) Dilution Fraction of Choices (%) No Dilution






Figure C-1. Histogram of Choices in HL Task – Overall Sample. (a) Diluted Group. (b) 
Undiluted Group. 
a.
b.
